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LAWYERING PARADOXES: MAKING MEANING OF
THE CONTRADICTIONS
Susan Sturm*
Effective lawyering requires the ability to manage contradictory yet
interdependent practices. In their role as traditionally understood,
lawyers must fight, judge, debate, minimize risk, and advance clients’
interests. Yet increasingly, lawyers must also collaborate, build trust,
innovate, enable effective risk-taking, and hold clients accountable for
adhering to societal values. Law students and lawyers alike struggle,
often unproductively, to reconcile these tensions. Law schools often
address them as a dilemma requiring a choice or overlook the
contradictions that interfere with their integration.
This Article argues that these seemingly contradictory practices
can be brought together through the theory and action of paradox. After
identifying the features of these two lawyering practices—called here
legality and proactive lawyering—the Article sets out five lawyering
paradoxes that stem from the opposing yet interdependent features of
legalistic and proactive lawyering: (1) paradoxes of thought and
discourse; (2) relationship; (3) motivation; (4) mindset; and (5) justice.
Next, the Article shows the consequences of legal education’s tendency
to avoid, sidestep, or downplay these paradoxes. Finally, drawing on
existing research and experiences of innovators, the Article identifies
three strategies that can enable students and lawyers to construct a
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dynamic tension between legality and proactive lawyering, and in the
process, build the potential for transformative learning and meaningful
justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From the moment I entered law school, and through four decades
as a lawyer and then a law professor, I have experienced lawyering as a
bundle of contradictions. Crossing the threshold into the legal world in
the late 1970s, I found that my dream of paving the way for a new era of
social justice ran headlong into the wall of austere tradition. This tension
between purpose and precedent replayed daily in the classroom during
my law school years. I often found myself frustrated and infuriated by
case law and Socratic dialogue, which instructed that “thinking like a
lawyer” meant looking backward rather than forward, following
authority rather than pursuing innovation and promoting predictability
rather than solving problems. Nonetheless, I absorbed the message that,
as lawyers, we would be expected to find solutions for the world’s most
intractable problems. Alongside its constraining energy, the role of the
lawyer would put me in positions requiring that I “think outside of the
box.”
In practice, I continued to grapple with these contradictions.
Legal reasoning and adversary process proved simultaneously
necessary and limiting, just as collaboration and problem solving
frequently encountered an immovable status quo. As a litigator, I
was continually buffeted by the need to fight while cooperating—as
part of conducting discovery, orchestrating a trial, or settling a case.
As an assistant to a master in a prison case, I witnessed the court’s
power to force prison officials to pay attention to inhumane and
abusive conditions that they had tolerated without consequence until
the court intervened. Yet, the court could not induce the cooperation
and commitment necessary for sustainable change; the force of law
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that put prison reform in the spotlight also triggered backlash and
resistance that undercut its power.1
As a law professor, I have experienced these contradictions in
my scholarship and teaching. In both arenas, I have explored
concepts and strategies that move from mindsets of compliance to
creative problem solving, from paradigms of gladiators to those of
problem solvers.2 I have grappled with ways that courts can
simultaneously serve as the backstop for enforcing prescriptions
against first-generation employment discrimination while creating
the framework to encourage problem-solving to address secondgeneration discrimination.3 I have proposed ways to integrate
problem-solving approaches with judicial intervention, and yet until
recently I remained dissatisfied with the strategies proposed to
reconcile or resolve the tensions between informal and collaborative
modes of problem-solving and more formal and compliance-based
approaches. Those contradictions also surfaced in my work to build
the capacity of judges, clerks, and other employees throughout the
court system to engage openly and constructively with race while
also developing a robust compliance process that holds people
accountable when they violate anti-discrimination rules.
As a teacher, every year I have witnessed many students
struggling with the contradictions that buffeted me as a law student. I
teach Civil Procedure alongside courses called Lawyering for
Change, Theater of Change, and Lawyer Leadership: Leading Self,
Leading Others, Leading Change. Each course aims to equip
students with capacities fundamental to lawyers’ roles in enabling
constructive human interaction. Yet, on their face, they seem to
require opposing capacities and to cultivate competing mindsets.
Students experienced this disconnect firsthand during an exercise we
conduct on the first day of class in Lawyer Leadership. We divide
students into small groups and ask each group to list the qualities or
descriptors that come to mind when they think of the words “law” and
“lawyer.” We then ask them to do the same with the word “leadership”
1. See Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 805 (1990); Susan Sturm, “Mastering”
Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979).
2. See Susan Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations
about Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119
(1997) [hereinafter Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem Solvers]; Susan Sturm, Reframing the
Civil Rights Narrative: From Compliance to Collective Impact, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN
AMERICAN LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS (Austin Sarat ed., 2014).
3. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
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and “leader.” When we come back together, we ask students what they
noticed about the “Law/Lawyer compared to the Leadership/Leader”
lists generated by each group. Students typically describe lawyers as
“competitive,” “aggressive,” “critical,” “adversarial,” “hard-working,”
and “risk-averse.” In contrast, the column for leaders contains
descriptors such as “creative,” “entrepreneurial,” “visionary,”
“inspiring,” and “collaborative.” It doesn’t take long for an observant
student to notice that there is virtually no overlap in their “lawyer” and
“leader” descriptors.4
These tensions have taken on particular urgency in the current
political moment. Many are looking to law—and especially the
judiciary—as the bulwark against the threat to democratic values facing
the United States and the larger world. At the same time, the legitimacy
of those same institutions is under attack from the highest levels of
government. Scholars and students are faced with the quandary of
simultaneously relying on traditional legal institutions while looking to
political mobilization and community organizing that call into question
the legitimacy of those core institutions.5 This requires finding ways to
address some of the most vexing challenges facing law schools and the
legal profession: How do you find and sustain meaning and imagination
in the face of skepticism built into law’s methodology? How do you
pursue justice through law if the legal system itself is, in important
respects, unjust? How do you equip law students and lawyers to navigate
the competing call of power and purpose?
I have come to realize that lawyers’ capacity for impact depends
upon making sense of and being able to forge constructive tension
between these oppositional aspects of lawyering. These core roles and
practices simultaneously contradict and depend on each other for the
legitimacy and effectiveness of both. Lawyers play a key role in
designing human interaction so that diverse people can peacefully and
effectively govern themselves. They bear responsibility for helping
individuals, organizations, and governments structure their affairs so
they can live and work together, even when they disagree. They are
4. This dichotomy between Law/Lawyer and leadership/Leader characterizes in legal
practitioners’ conceptions as well. See ROBERT W. CULLEN, THE LEADING LAWYER: A
GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW AND LEADERSHIP (2009) (reporting similar non-overlapping
descriptors when seasoned lawyers asked to describe lawyering and leadership).
5. See Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls, Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989) (“[O]utsiders, including
feminists and people of color, have embraced legalism as a tool of necessity, making legal
consciousness their own in order to attack injustice.”); Bob Post, Leadership in Law Schools,
SEC. ON LEADERSHIP (Mar. 8, 2019), https://sectiononleadership.org/2019/03/08/leadershipin-law-schools/; see also infra Section II.E.
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called upon to be problem solvers and facilitators of human interaction.
These informal and facilitative interactions take place in the shadow of
background norms and rules developed by lawyers and legal institutions.
When conflict erupts and relationships break down, law—through
lawyers—enforces rules and enables people to fight without resorting to
violence, using adversarial tools to allocate responsibility, impose
judgment, and enforce rules. Effective lawyers must both fight and
collaborate, judge and build trust, debate and design new institutions,
minimize risk and enable effective risk-taking, and advance clients’
values and hold clients accountable for adhering to societal values.
A. The Conventional Approach: Supplementing Legality With
Proactive Lawyering
Progress has been made in incorporating what I call proactive
lawyering into a curriculum organized around the logic of what I call
legality. I define legality to mean the application of legal precepts to
situations requiring authoritative resolution, along with the behavior of
lawyers seeking to influence those enforceable rules and outcomes.
More simply put, legality involves adjudication. Its focus is on legal
rules, the adversary process, and legal reasoning. I define proactive
lawyering to mean lawyers’ practices enabling the realization of social
norms and goals by individuals, groups, and institutions in situations
operating in the shadow of formal law. It calls upon lawyers to
“integrate not only the ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ but the ‘is,’ the ‘ought,’ and the
‘what might be.’ ” 6 Proactive lawyering bears many of the markers of
leadership—utilizing skills and practices enabling others to identify and
pursue their needs and goals, communicate effectively, resolve conflicts,
solve problems, and design settings that facilitate productive human
interaction. Proactive lawyering operates at the intersection of
professional practice and purposeful human interaction.
Although many law schools continue to be organized around
legality’s logic of learning to “think like a lawyer,”7 in recent years law
schools have expanded offerings cultivating proactive lawyering,
including clinical legal education, added experiential learning
requirements, and introduced interdisciplinary offerings and courses
focused on problem-solving, deal-making, and alternative dispute
resolution.8 Some doctrinal teachers incorporate critical methodologies
into their teaching and experiment with experiential pedagogy in the
6. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1983).
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. See infra Section I.B.
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conventional law school classroom. Most recently, law schools,
including my own, have focused explicit attention on cultivating
lawyer-leadership skills.9
Notwithstanding these developments, most law schools have yet to
come to terms with how to prepare students—and the legal
profession—to navigate the tensions between legality and proactive
lawyering.10 They have tended to avoid, sidestep, or downplay the
tendency of legality to crowd out proactive lawyering, and of legal
education’s culture to undercut efforts to promote students’
transformative potential. The prevailing strategy for promoting the
capacity to navigate these opposing aspects of lawyering could be called
“add and stir.” Much of the literature either explicitly or implicitly
assumes that proactive lawyering can be added into the law school
curriculum as supplementary competencies.11 A case in point is a report
urging that lawyers “be equipped with a broad range of ‘complementary
competencies’ that supplement and expand the ‘core’ competencies of
legal reasoning and analysis that have been traditionally taught in law
school and emphasized in legal practice.”12
The complementarity argument goes something like this: the
current law school curriculum (and the accompanying pedagogy)
emphasizing the development of legal analytical skills are valid and
should continue to be the center of the law school curriculum and
pedagogy. It is, however, too narrow. It does not adequately equip
students to navigate the array of challenges they will face in their
multiple roles, to take up the leadership that society calls upon lawyers
9. See Leadership, COLUM. L. SCH., https://www.law.columbia.edu/areas-ofstudy/leadership (last visited Nov. 17, 2021). As of March 2019, more than 50 law schools
reported having some type of leadership programming and/or courses. Leah Teague, A
Message from the Chair-2019, SEC. ON LEADERSHIP (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://sectiononleadership.org/2019/03/.
10. There are law schools that have faced this challenge head on as part of their creation,
such as CUNY Law School, Northeastern Law School, and more recently, University of
California at Irvine. See History, CUNY SCH. L., https://www.law.cuny.edu/about/history/
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019); UCI Law Historical Timeline, UCI L.,
https://www.law.uci.edu/10th/timeline.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
11. See Georgia Sorenson, The Nexus Between Leadership Theory and Law, in LAW AND
LEADERSHIP: INTEGRATING LEADERSHIP STUDIES INTO THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 19,
19-32 (Paula Monopoli & Susan McCarty eds., 2013); Larry Richard, Leadership
Competencies in Law, in LAW AND LEADERSHIP: INTEGRATING LEADERSHIP STUDIES INTO
THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 35, 35-53 (Paula Monopoli & Susan McCarty eds., 2013);
see also Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Legal Design for Practice, Activism, Policy and Research,
46 J.L. & SOC’Y 185 (2019) (focusing on legal design for activism which exposes and
remedies biases and inequalities).
12. BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR., WILLIAM F. LEE & DAVID B. WILKINS, LAWYERS AS
PROFESSIONALS AND AS CITIZENS: KEY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY
9 (2014), https://clp.law.harvard.edu/assets/Professionalism-Project-Essay_11.20.14.pdf.
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to exercise, and to do so at a time of increasing volatility, complexity,
and urgency. Proactive lawyering can be added to the prevailing
pedagogy to meet these needs because the skills associated with learning
leadership are compatible with, or at least not opposed to, those involved
in learning how to “think like a lawyer” in the traditional sense of what
that means. Proactive lawyering thus can and should simply be added
onto learning to operate in lawyers’ more conventional adjudicatory
roles.
This “complementarity” strategy sidesteps fundamental ways that
legal education geared toward cultivating legality operates in tension
with—and sometimes in opposition to—the kind of learning and practice
required for proactive lawyering. Much of the literature promoting
proactive lawyering treats the capacities and mindsets celebrated in the
Socratic classroom—judgment, categorization, critique, risk
minimization, and reasoning from precedent—as limitations to be
overcome or minimized. Perhaps most fundamentally, the notions of
justice embraced by legality as opposed to proactive lawyering directly
collide.13 Unless these tensions are addressed, features of legal
education operating within the conventional paradigm are likely to
marginalize and undercut the efforts to build lawyers’ proactive
lawyering capacities.
B. Reframing Legality’s Dualities as Paradoxes
The concept of paradox holds the key to navigating these
contradictory yet linked aspects of lawyering. A paradox is a statement
or proposition with positions that are conflicting and yet both are true.14
Paradoxes involve struggle because they call upon mindsets or practices
that tend to interfere with each other, even as they depend upon each
other. A growing body of organizational and change literature offers
insights into both how paradoxes operate and how they can operate
virtuously rather than as a vicious cycle.15 This literature points toward
finding ways to live with and learn from the tensions, instead of ignoring
or trying to eliminate them.
In key respects, the paradoxical elements of lawyering are built into
law’s structure, role, and practice. At the level of structure, formal and
informal constitutions (such as contracts) set up law both to provide
13. See infra Section II.E.
14. See KENWYN K. SMITH & DAVID N. BERG, PARADOXES OF GROUP LIFE:
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT, PARALYSIS, AND MOVEMENT IN GROUP DYNAMICS 3-18
(1987); Peter Elbow, Embracing Contraries in the Teaching Process, 45 C. ENG. 327, 300
(1983).
15. See infra Section I.B.
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structures and processes enabling people to interact, cooperate, and
make decisions, on the one hand, and to enable people to fight without
violence and to abide by decisions that will be backed by force, on the
other. Lawyers sit at the cusp of these paradoxical functions.16
These tensions also inhere at the level of role. Lawyers are called
upon to build relationships, design contracts, enable cooperation and
collaboration, “constitute” governments, facilitate transactions,17 solve
problems, and facilitate wise decision-making.
They must
simultaneously be ready to fight on behalf of clients, to be the stewards
of the adversary process, and to discipline the exercise of the violence of
the state. These roles are in tension. They are also interdependent.
Lawyers cannot conduct a trial without both cooperating and fighting.
They cannot steward an effective deal without both minimizing and
facilitating risk-taking.
Finally, the practices required for effective lawyering are
themselves paradoxical. Conventional lawyering and leadership will
sometimes require competing mindsets, skills, and practices. Lawyers
have to judge while they also listen, enable, and empathize. They have
to create the conditions for growth and learning, even as they set up the
processes to locate or cabin legal responsibility. They have to be in a
creative mindset even as they facilitate compliance and reactive risk
avoidance.
The tensions that manifest in the relationship between legality and
proactive lawyering lie at the heart of what makes lawyers distinctive,
necessary, and effective. The most successful and impactful lawyers live
in these tensions. The role of law and lawyers fundamentally involves
the capacity to combine these contradictory modes of thinking, acting,
and interacting. This capacity to hold paradox may be what equips
lawyers to exercise truly effective leadership.18 It matters both for
lawyers in more conventional roles and for those who, over the course
of their careers, will occupy formal leadership roles in the public,
16. Robert Cover brilliantly portrayed these dualities as a defining feature of law: “Law
may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of a reality to an imagined
alternative — that is, as a connective between two states of affairs, both of which can be
represented in their normative significance only through the devices of narrative.” Cover,
supra note 6, at 9.
17. Lawyers help facilitate transactions as part of their roles in making deals, crafting
contracts, working as in-house counsel, structuring public policymaking, navigating the
break-down of long-term relationships, and conducting alternative dispute resolution.
18. See ROBERT J. ANDERSON & WILLIAM A. ADAMS, MASTERING LEADERSHIP: AN
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR BREAKTHROUGH PERFORMANCE AND EXTRAORDINARY
BUSINESS RESULTS 94 (2016) (“The ability to hold opposites, conflict, tension, and polarity,
without avoiding them, over-simplifying them or resorting to quick fixes is the hallmark of
leadership.”).
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private, and non-profit sectors.19 When lawyers without this capacity
occupy leadership roles, that deficit may help us understand the
spectacular failures that unfold when they get stuck on one side or the
other of the paradox. The challenge facing law schools is to figure out
how to build that tension—and the capacity to manage it—into their
practices and cultures. Law school can have a profound impact on how
lawyers approach the paradoxical aspects of their roles. It offers a
unique opportunity to forge a dynamic relationship between legality and
proactive lawyering.
This Article argues for naming legality’s dualities, reframing them
as paradoxes, embracing those paradoxes as challenging but necessary,
and engaging law schools and the legal profession in building capacity
to navigate these contradictory yet interdependent requirements. Section
I lays out the contrary yet interdependent features of legality and
proactive lawyering. Section II explores what makes those tensions
paradoxical. This Section identifies the five lawyer leadership
paradoxes of thought and discourse; relationship; motivation; mindset;
and justice. These paradoxes affect how lawyers will experience
leadership learning. Section III shows the limitations of prevailing
strategies for reconciling the contradictions between legality and
proactive lawyering. Finally, Section IV offers three strategies for
enabling law students, law schools, and legal organizations to hold
contradictory messages and mindsets, and for using this paradoxical
approach to strengthen and deepen leadership capacity in lawyers.
II. DEFINING THE DUALITY
Legality and proactive lawyering employ different and, in some
respects, opposing logics that are also interdependent. Before we can
explore the duality’s paradoxical nature, we must first define its two
sides.
Section A identifies and briefly describes three defining attributes
of legality: formality, authority, and adversarialism. These pillars of
legality’s logic also anchor the contradictions built into legal education
19. DEBORAH L. RHODE & AMANDA K. PACKEL, LEADERSHIP FOR LAWYERS 3 (2018)
(“The most crucial challenges of our times involve issues of leadership and, in the United
States, no occupation is more responsible for producing leaders than that of law. The legal
profession has supplied a majority of American presidents and, in recent decades, almost half
the members of Congress. Although they account for just 0.4 percent of the population,
lawyers are well represented at all levels of leadership, as governors, state legislators, judges,
prosecutors, general counsel, law firm managing partners, and heads of corporate,
government, and nonprofit organizations.”). Rhode also notes that “Americans place lawyers
in leadership positions in much higher percentages than other countries.” DEBORAH L.
RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 3 (2013).
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and lawyering. Section B first identifies the forms of practice falling
under the rubric of proactive lawyering, and then identifies the features
that operate alongside and, in certain respects, in tension with legality in
both the law school curriculum and legal practice: informality, a focus
on efficacy, and collaboration.
A. Lawyering’s Default Paradigm: Adjudicatory Lawyering and the
Rule of Law
Legality lies at the heart of conventional legal education and of
law’s claim to legitimacy.20 Law school initiates students to the legal
profession by schooling them in a distinctive mode of thinking, relating,
and motivating action, which has come to define what it means to “think
like a lawyer.”21 This is conventionally conceived to mean engaging in
formal, adversarial modes of argumentation and decision-making,
governed by precedent and backed by sanctions.22 The first-year
curriculum focuses primarily on teaching students legal reasoning,
argumentation, and decision-making as the operating system for the rule
of law, which functions as lawyers’ default mode of thinking and
acting.23 For many lawyers and commentators, traditional legal methods
and analysis “should continue to be at the core of legal education, as well
as of any plausible professional licensing regime.”24
Legality’s domain is not limited to judges and the lawyers
appearing before them. Administrative agencies, legislatures, and
organizations also deploy legality’s processes and analytical tools to
enhance their decisions’ legitimacy.25 Students often learn about
20. I am using “legality” as a descriptive rather than evaluative term, to connote the
modes of reasoning and decision making that characterize widely shared features that define
what it means to operate under the rule of law. I am in good company in using the term
“legality” in this manner. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman, Legality and the Endogeneity of Law,
in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY: ON THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK
(Robert A. Kagan et al. eds., 2002); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); PHILIP
SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969).
21. HEINEMAN, LEE & WILKINS, supra note 12, at 9.
22. See id. at 59; ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO
“THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2009); SELZNICK, supra note 20; see also Todd D.
Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 607
(2007).
23. HEINEMAN, LEE & WILKINS, supra note 12, at 13.
24. Id. The MacCrate Report, intended to spark curricular reform in legal education,
states that “law schools should continue to emphasize the teaching of ‘legal analysis and
reasoning,’ and ‘legal research.’ ” AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT — AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 234 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
25. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 14 (2008); Jonathan S.
Gould, Law Within Congress, 129 YALE L.J. 1946, 1951 (2020); Sarah A. Seo, Democratic
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administrative agencies, legislatures, or business transactions by reading
appellate decisions that deal with unresolved conflicts occurring in those
settings, and by applying an adversarial mode of inquiry to analyzing the
work of these institutions. Legality provides the stamp of legitimacy
associated with the rule of law.26
The literature analyzing what it means to “think like a
lawyer”—and how legal education teaches the mastery of adjudicatory
lawyering—focuses on three defining features: formality, authority, and
adversarialism. These features combine to structure how law students,
particularly in their first year, learn to reason, communicate, interact, and
orient their learning.27 Together they operate as “a now canonical
practice of legal analysis,”28 an operating system that orients many
students’ professional identity as lawyers. These pillars of legality’s
logic also anchor the contradictions built into legal education and
lawyering.
1. Formality
Formality is one of legality’s most visible and defining features.
The actors operating within the legal system occupy formal roles that
define their authority and structure their relationships (lawyer, client,
judge, legislator, administrator, etc.). Professional and legal norms
dictate how people in different legal positions communicate and relate
to each other. People refer to each other by role (Judge, Professor), and
their interactions often take place in venues that structure the form and
boundaries of interaction among the participants in the adversary
process. Classrooms are organized to resemble courtrooms, with
attention focused on the professor and the judge as the arbiter of
interaction. The relationships of professor and student, lawyer and
client, judge and litigant operate within a ritualized structure with a
prescribed form.29 Learning the law involves becoming acculturated to
Policing Before the Due Process Revolution, 128 YALE L.J. 1246, 1248 (2019); Edelman,
supra note 20, at 187; see also Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies, The Legalistic Organization:
Definitions, Dimensions, and Dilemmas, 4 ORG. SCI. 345 (1993).
26. Edelman, supra note 20, at 187; Sitkin & Bies, supra note 25.
27. See MERTZ, supra note 22; Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the
Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier,
The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and
Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515 (2007).
28. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 36
(1996).
29. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 242-44 (observing that the predominant form
of pedagogy in the law school classroom is dissecting an appellate case, and that a minority
of students have exposure to other aspects of legal interaction); SCHAUER, supra note 22, at
9-10 (describing the traditional Socratic ritual between professor and student demonstrating
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the formality of space, language, roles, and relationships in the
classroom and the law school culture.30
Formality also prescribes the prevailing mode of thought for judges,
lawyers, and law students. Legal reasoning—reasoning analogically,
formally, and from precedent—is “what distinguishes lawyers from
other sorts of folk.”31 Legal norms “characteristically satisfy certain
formal conditions—such as generality—which are usually taken to be
necessary conditions also for justice.”32 Legal reasoning proceeds by
identifying the relevant legal categories and placing people’s conduct
into those categories.33 In this sense, formality operates as defining
feature of “the rule of law”: “to move from a nonlegal to a legal mode of
governance is to move to a situation where there will be a special and
explicit concern for treating like cases alike, for universalization, and for
proceeding in a rule-like manner.”34 Although legal analysis has moved
beyond formalism, formality continues to remain alive in legal thought,
with its emphasis on predictability, uniformity of treatment, reasoning
from precedent, and transparency.35
2. Legitimacy grounded in authority
Legality prioritizes rule-based decision-making, precedent, and
reliance on authority as the source of law.36 “A legal system is known
by the existence of authoritative rules.”37
Argumentation and
decision-making proceed by reasoning from precedent and
authority—essentially backward-looking analytical and logical analysis
assessing whether the conduct falls within the scope of an authoritative
legal rule or principle.38 Decisions turn on the dictates of written-down
to the “hapless student” how “the best legal outcome may be something other than the best
outcome for the immediate controversy.”).
30. MERTZ, supra note 22 (providing through a detailed ethnographic study of the first
year law school class the process by which law students become acculturated to formal,
hierarchical modes of interaction that normalize power imbalances and make value choices
seem neutral); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27 (showing how the culture of legal education
defines students’ conception of lawyering in terms of adversarial, formalized conflict,
overseen by professors and judges, and resolved through win-lose choices).
31. SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 1.
32. Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise Justice?, in LEGALITY AND COMMUNITY: ON
THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF PHILIP SELZNICK, supra note 20, at 110.
33. See Cover, supra note 6, at 6-7.
34. Waldron, supra note 32, at 110.
35. SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 32-33 (describing law’s formalism as pervasive).
36. Id. at 5; EDWARD LEVI & FREDERICK SCHAUER, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 1-2 (1949); Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV.
829, 836 (1990).
37. SELZNICK, supra note 20, at 5.
38. LEVI & SCHAUER, supra note 36.
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rules, applied in new situations.39 Individual judgment operates under
the constraint of precedent.40 “It is the precedent’s source or status that
gives it force, not the soundness of its reasoning nor the belief of the
instant court that its outcome was correct.”41
Law students and lawyers are socialized to value this mode of
thought as fundamental to what it means to “think like a lawyer.”42
Students learn to support their arguments for how a case should turn out
with authority and reasoning by analogy to precedent, rather than with
what they think is right or just, might improve the situation, or produce
a better outcome.43 This form of reasoning is counter-intuitive; it
dictates, “[o]utcomes other than those the decision-maker would
otherwise seem to be the best all-things-considered outcome for the case
at hand.”44
Authority operates within legality in a second important respect: as
a way to enforce compliance with legal norms. A distinguishing feature
of law is its relationship to state-sanctioned coercion. Legality relies
ultimately on the power of the state to enforce norms and thus to
motivate behavior. Legal actors achieve adherence through the
imposition of legal requirements, the expression of legal duties to
comply with those responsibilities, threats of negative consequences for
failing to adhere, and when necessary, coercion.45 The motivation for
adhering to norms is basically extrinsic, in the form of duty, incentives,
threats, and force.46
Both of these aspects of authority relate to one crucial function of
law: as Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer have written, “an
important—perhaps the important—function of law is its ability to settle
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2-3.
41. SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 41; see also SELZNICK, supra note 20, at 12 (arguing
that law’s legitimacy derives from emphasis on authoritative sources as a way to cabin
arbitrariness).
42. SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 7-8.
43. Id. at 8-9.
44. Id.
45. See Cover, supra note 6, at 7-8.
46. See id.; William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule
Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 42 (Gráinne de Búrca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (“The American legal system stands ready to commit vast resources
to the determination and evaluation of past conduct in order to calibrate present reward or
punishment to it.”); Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role
Of Motivation In Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1934
(2009) (“[T]he law operates in the first instance as an external motivator that defines wrongful
behaviors and penalizes people who engage in them . . . .”); Cover, supra note 6, at 40
(defining law as necessarily jurispathic because it involves norms backed by the violence of
the state).
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authoritatively what is to be done.”47 In Philip Selznick’s words, “the
special work of law is to identify claims and obligations that merit
official validation and enforcement.”48
3. Adversarialism
A third defining feature of legality is adversarialism: two opposing
sides put their best arguments forward, enabling a neutral
decision-maker to reach a correct decision based on the merits of those
arguments.49 Adversarialism constructs conflict as a contest between
competing positions. Each situation has two opposing sides, and the
process will produce a winner and a loser. Within the adversary model,
lawyers are understood to have a fiduciary duty to advance the interests
and improving the situation of one party as against the interests of the
opposing party.50 Lawyers’ ethical responsibilities to their clients stem
from a commitment to the adversary system, incarnated in the Model
Rules of Professional Responsibility.51
From the outset, students learn that the adversary process is the gold
standard for the rule of law. In the conventional law school classroom,
adversarial conflict provides the underlying framework of interaction,
knowledge generation, and problem-solving. As presented in most law
school classes, law addresses conflict in highly formal settings aimed at
determining winners and losers. Problems are converted into binary
options, and they are “resolved” by using authority and rigorous analysis
to test the strength of those options. Competition functions to establish
47. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377 (1997).
48. SELZNICK, supra note 20, at 5.
49. For a discussion of the origins and operation adversary process in American Law,
see generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); AMALIA
D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE (2017); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM:
A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984). For a summary of critiques, see Carrie MenkelMeadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
50. Id.; see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 551 (1994)
(“In the litigation context, the client’s preferred position is given shape through the norm of
zealous advocacy: the lawyer must vigorously assert the client’s interests; the final authority
on important issues of strategy rests with the client; and the client may discharge his lawyer
at will, but the lawyer has only limited ability to withdraw from representation.”); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 377, 378 (2004).
51. See William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of Some
Academic Perspectives, GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 1, 9 -10 (2010) (acknowledging that the
Model Rules incarnate adversarialism but critiquing legal ethics scholars for failing to
incorporate ordinary morality as part of resolving ambiguities in what adversarialism
requires).
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the truth. The adversary process and rank ordering define success as
winning that competition—in class, in an argument, in the courtroom, or
elsewhere.52
The conventional law school classroom mirrors adjudication’s
adversarial and formal idea of conflict. The professor structures
interactions with students by invoking the style of an appellate judge
who questions lawyers representing one side or the other to ferret out the
weaknesses in their positions and validate winning arguments.53
The adversary process holds a special place in the prevailing
professional and public understanding of what it means to be governed
by the rule of law.54 Felix Frankfurter’s oft-cited quote from Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath conveys the essence of the
commitment to adversarialism as a hallmark of legality:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to
give a person in jeopardy of a serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for
generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done.55

Legality’s defining features—formality, authority, and
adversarialism—orient students to the legal profession and shape how
many in the legal profession understand what it means to “think like a
lawyer.” Legality casts a shadow over non-adjudicatory aspects of
lawyering, such as negotiations and client counseling.56 These defining
features also figure prominently in the popular understanding of law and
lawyering.57 In conventional pedagogy, jurisprudence, and scholarship,
legality is often contrasted with other modes of thought and decision
making—politics, personal preferences, bargaining, mediating,
organizing, managing—as a way of differentiating law from other modes

52. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27.
53. See MERTZ, supra note 22, at 7-8; SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 9.
54. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 47, at 1371.
55. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
56. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (describing how lawyers conduct settlement
negotiations in light of the outcomes they would be likely to achieve if the case went to trial);
ROBERT MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000) (describing how lawyers
conduct settlement negotiations in light of the outcomes they would be likely to achieve if the
case went to trial).
57. Merriam-Webster’s definition of “law” embodies legality’s features: “binding
custom or practice of a community: a rule of conduct or action prescribed . . . or formally
recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling authority.” Law, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/law (last visited Nov. 18, 2021).
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of decision making and aspiring to make good on legality’s promises of
predictability, generality of understanding and application, legitimacy,
and order.58
Though legality has endured as the default logic in most law
schools, it has been the focus of waves of critique by legal scholars,
educational reformers, and students.59 Legal realists criticized the
court-centered and formalistic focus of legality, both in practice and in
legal education, and sought to widen or shift the focus to include
systematic empirical study, sociological jurisprudence, and the
legislative realm.60 Critical legal scholars, critical race theorists, and
feminist theorists have challenged basic assumptions underlying
legality–that politics could be separated from law, that law operates
neutrally, and that legal doctrine rather than power and ideology dictates
judicial outcomes.61 Commentators have criticized legality for its
disconnection from practice and its failure to prepare students for the full
array of competencies required for effective lawyering. Legality
conveys an overly narrow idea of lawyers’ roles if it addresses lawyering
at all. These critiques have prompted the introduction of courses that
extend beyond legality, with features quite different from those called
for by legality.
B. Legality’s Duality: Proactive Lawyering
Although legality has maintained its canonical status in legal
education, lawyers and academics alike recognize that law and
lawyering also entail ways of thinking, relating, and practicing that do
not conform to legality’s conventions.62 Though these practices occur
in different venues, they share features requiring overlapping
competencies and roles that can be cultivated systematically if they are
58. See SELZNICK, supra note 20 (contrasting law with other forms of public decision
making); see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353 (1978) (differentiating adjudication from voting and agreement as forms of social
ordering). Roberto Unger eloquently summarizes the animating idea of contemporary law and
legal doctrine “as a binary system of rights of choice and of arrangements withdrawn from
choice the better to make the exercise of choice real and effective.” UNGER, supra note 28,
at 27, 65.
59. I am indebted to Jed Purdy for this way of organizing the critique of legality.
60. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 161-62 (1949); Karl N. Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008). The realist critique
is summarized in SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 124-34.
61. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY (1983) (critiquing that the American legal education a reinforces class, race, and
gender inequality); UNGER, supra note 28.
62. See Fuller, supra note 58 (embracing lawyers’ roles in contracting, politics, and
legislation, along with adjudication); see also MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 24.
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recognized as part of the same field of practice. These lawyering
practices also bear a similar relationship to legality: they both conflict
with legality’s defining features and are integrally linked with legality’s
operation.
This Article uses the term “proactive lawyering” as the umbrella for
the full range of lawyering activities that involve taking the steps needed
to meet needs, address problems, and achieve goals.63 The umbrella term
of proactive lawyering refers to lawyers’ roles and practices that enable
individuals, groups, and institutions to realize collective aims in
situations operating in the shadow of legal rules. It includes lawyers’
role as what Lon Fuller referred to as the architect of social structure:
creators and managers of the various forms of legal order.64 Fulfilling
this architectural role requires close attention to problems of institutional
design, in which the concern is with ends as well as means. Proactive
lawyering also includes lawyers’ roles as problem solvers: actors whose
role is to help people and institutions move in the desired direction,
where there is no obvious path from the current situation toward the
desired outcome, again where legal rules operate in the background.
Finally, proactive lawyering includes lawyers’ roles in combining the
human and professional dimensions of lawyers’ adjudicative roles.
These three dimensions all fall within the dictionary definition of
proactive: “acting in anticipation of future problems, needs, or
changes.”65
I also use “proactive” as an acronym to convey the range of roles
and practices that lawyers engage in that share these features:
P

Problem solver

R

Researcher
Reflective practitioner

63. Other options that have been proposed as an umbrella term include problem solving,
holistic lawyering, professionalism, and lawyer leadership. For a discussion of the limitations
of these alternatives and relationship of proactive lawyering to lawyer leadership, see Susan
Sturm, Leadership by Any Other Name (forthcoming) (on file with author).
64. Lon Fuller, The Lawyer as Architect of Social Structure, in THE PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER 269 (Kenneth Winston ed., 1981),
quoted in David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801
(1998).
65. Proactive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
proactive (last visited Sept. 14, 2021).
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O

Observer

A

Advisor
Architect of social structure

C

Counselor
Capacity builder
Change agent
Translator
Transaction engineer
Thought partner
Intermediary
Institutional designer
Information integrator
Values maximizer

T
I

V
E
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Enabler
Educator
Ethicist

Lawyers’ proactive roles as architects of social structure, problem
solvers, and humanistic lawyers demand a shared set of practices, skills,
and mindsets that operate in tension with those called for by legality.
This section first catalogues the domains that regularly employ proactive
lawyering. It then identifies three features that characterize proactive
lawyering: informality, a focus on efficacy, and collaboration.
1. A map of proactive lawyering domains
Lawyers are called upon to engage in proactive lawyering both as
part of their work representing clients in litigation and in the many
domains of legal practice operating outside of adjudication.
a. Aspects of adjudication requiring practices beyond legality
Although legality structures the logic of analysis and decision
making in adjudication, the processes required for adjudication to occur,
as well as for giving force to resulting judgments, cannot proceed only
through legality. They also require more collaborative, informal, and
facilitative modes of thought, interaction, and practice. Interactions with
the client leading up to litigation involve advising, counseling, and
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fact-gathering.66
Discovery and trial preparation calls for
non-adversarial, forward-looking interactions with opposing counsel,
experts, and potential witnesses. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure demand that lawyers work together at every critical juncture
of litigation.67 The rules, along with mutual self-interest, also yield
incentives and processes to induce settlement.68 Indeed, most cases
settle, meaning that even for litigators, lawyers (encouraged by judges)
will resolve cases through informal interactions aimed at achieving
mutually agreed-upon resolution, which in turn requires cooperation
with client and adversaries.69 Remedies, particularly injunctive
remedies, also call upon courts and lawyers to construct forward-looking
solutions that can effectively address legal violations.70
Even within legal doctrinal analysis, modes of thinking beyond
conventionally defined legality come into play. As legal theorists and
critics have noted, classic legal reasoning (meaning using logic, analysis,
analogy, and precedent to decide cases) cannot actually resolve cases
where the legal rule is ambiguous, the situation is complex, and
competing policies dictate different outcomes. Where there is no clear
rule or applicable precedent, courts and lawyers must grapple with
competing values.71 Some mode of decision-making beyond logic and
analogy is needed to select among these competing values.72
b. Non-legalistic judicial arenas
A panoply of judicial arenas—some old and some new— do not
conform in significant respects to the pillars of legality envisioned by the
first-year curriculum and instead operate with a logic that emphasizes
66. See generally DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENTCENTERED APPROACH (1991).
67. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 26, 37, 68.
68. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 50, at 516.
69. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459–570 (2004) (describing the
growing predominance of alternative dispute resolution as opposed to adjudication as the
means of resolving conflicts).
70. See Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1364-65 (1991); Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts; Rethinking the Judicial
Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUROPEAN L. 565 (2006); see also Charles F. Sabel
& William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1055 (2004).
71. See UNGER, supra note 28, at 115; see generally Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme
Court 1997 Term – Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1998).
72. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 379-80 (2007) (quoting ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY,
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 10-11 (2005)).
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problem-solving and conflict resolution. Family court,73 juvenile court,
problem-solving courts74 (such as drug courts and homelessness courts),
and bankruptcy courts all depart significantly from conventional
adjudication and rely heavily on informal processes.75 Their focus is on
problem solving and remediation. Their method relies heavily on
collaboration and strives to minimize adversarialism. In addition, many
litigants proceed pro se; many court systems have adapted their roles and
practices to adapt to this reality, often in ways that do not hew closely to
the demands of legality.76
c. Non-adjudicative legal practice
Alongside their roles in processing adversary conflict, law and
lawyers are called upon to structure and facilitate human interactions
enabling individuals, groups, communities, and polities to achieve
shared goals, produce value, and solve problems. Many aspects of legal
practice operate outside of the confines of the legality framework and
require different mindsets, competencies, and practices. Alternative
dispute resolution takes place both in the shadow of the law and outside
the formal legal system.77 Mediation and negotiation are a mainstay of
legal practice. These processes and practices come into play both as an
explicit form of conflict resolution and in the process of everyday
interactions with clients, collaborators, and adversaries.
Lawyers also are engaged in problem-solving as a crucial aspect of
their counseling, facilitation, advising, and intermediary roles.78 They
help clients, organizations, communities, and systems address problems
73. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY ET AL., DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 52-54 (1992) (noting divorces resolved through negotiation).
74. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 829 (2000) (discussing the experimentalist
and collaborative architecture of the drug courts); Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in
Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851
(1997) (discussing the need for moving beyond adjudication in criminal justice, family court,
and jury system).
75. See Amy J. Cohen, The Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 91, 10001 (2011).
76. Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark,
Studying the “New” Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249, 253 (2018).
77. See, e.g., CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2018); MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 56; see also
THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 616 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman,
eds., 2006).
78. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lawyers as Problems Solvers, 72 TEMP. L.
REV. 811 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party
Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 793–94
(1999); Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem Solvers, supra note 2 (exploring the features of
a problem-solving approach to legal education and lawyering).
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in the classic sense (an issue that requires resolution) as well as problems
in the sense of something that has gone awry and requires remediation.
Transactional lawyering and lawyers representing organizations
certainly employ legality as part of their practice, but their roles and
relationships are much more facilitative and oriented toward enabling
clients to achieve their aims. 79 They add value by sharing non-legal
knowledge, facilitating collaboration, serving as intermediaries, building
trust, problem-solving, and designing systems of mutual accountability
and problem-solving. All of these aspects of transactional lawyering call
for informal, constructive, integrative, and forward-looking modes of
thinking, relating, and motivating practice. Lawyers representing
organizations (both for-profit and non-profit) operate both inside and
outside the legality frame, using mindsets and strategies focused on
enabling the organization to achieve its goals while minimizing legal
risk.80
Human rights practice is another area that calls upon lawyers to play
roles beyond legality. Core human rights practices call for changing
norms and practices through political mobilization and building the
capacity of directly affected communities to advocate on their own
behalf.81 Human rights practice thus rests upon multidimensional
lawyering, using informal norms, building alliances, marshaling public
opinion, building the capacity of directly affected communities to
advocate on their own behalf, and marshaling informal incentives and
tools to hold individuals, corporations, and governments accountable,
realize rights, and advance change.
Movement lawyering and social change lawyering increasingly
involves these multi-dimensional strategies and roles, operating
alongside law reform and litigation strategies. 82 Although litigation
continues to play a central role in social change work, lawyers and legal

79. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 50, at 3 (celebrating lawyers’ roles in value creation
and allocation).
80. See BJARNE P. TELLMANN, BUILDING AN OUTSTANDING LEGAL TEAM: BATTLE
TESTED STRATEGIES FROM A GENERAL COUNSEL 34-40 (2017).
81. JO BECKER, CAMPAIGNING FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN
PRACTICE (2012); TRICIA CORNELL, KATE KELSCH & NICOLE PALASZ, NEW TACTICS IN
HUMAN RIGHTS: A RESOURCE FOR PRACTITIONERS (2004) (describing the importance of
mobilizing power and tactical mapping as core human strategies important for lawyers).
82. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Multidimensional Advocacy as Applied: Marriage Equality
and Reproductive Rights, 29 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7 (2015); see also KIMBERLY
AUSTIN, ELIZABETH CHU & JAMES LIEBMAN, RE-ENVISIONING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
(2017), https://cprl.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Publications/CPRL_2017_
Re-envisioning%20Professional%20Education_FINAL.pdf.
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scholars utilize an array of methods, with litigation embedded in a
broader theory of change aimed at having an impact.83
d. New forms and institutions of legal decision making
Finally, law and lawyering practices and roles are adapting to the
demands of highly complex, uncertain, and troubled times by forging
new institutional forms that can accommodate volatility, complexity,
and uncertainty. These forms emphasize collaboration, peer-to-peer
learning, experimentation, and adaptability. Legality’s limits have also
prompted some scholars to call for an expansion of what we mean by
legality to include institutional reimagination and redesign.84
Some of this work focuses on expanding or rethinking the role of
the judiciary to operate in dynamic relationships with other institutional
actors that develop effective modes of problem solving and innovation.85
Some focus on linking informal dispute resolution and problem solving
with the process of generating public norms.86 Some focus on
constructing and linking intermediary institutions and “organizational
catalysts” that will spur ongoing learning, mutual accountability, and
adaptive norms.87 These new forms, emerging in both theory and
practice, call for more collaborative, creative, and learning-focused
modes of law and lawyering.
2. Proactive lawyering’s defining features
The proactive lawyering practices discussed in the previous section
are all aimed at enabling individuals, groups, and institutions to achieve
their goals and aspirations in a world shaped but not fully defined by
law. This section describes three key features of proactive lawyering
practices and roles: (1) informality, (2) legitimacy grounded in efficacy,
83. See generally Goldberg, supra note 82; Michael Grinthal, Power With: Practice
Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 25 (2011).
84. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term – Foreword: The Limits
of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998); Rakoff & Minow, supra note 22, at
602 (calling for pedagogy developing students’ legal imagination–“the ability to generate the
multiple characterizations, multiple versions, multiple pathways, and multiple solutions, to
which they could apply their very well-honed analytic skills”).
85. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 70; see also Scott & Sturm, supra note 70 (arguing
for courts’ roles in structuring deliberation by other actors in accordance with rule-of-law
values).
86. See Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves,
33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 523 (2008); Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict
Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2007).
87. See Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US, supra note 46,
at 2-3; Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher
Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 287 (2006).
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and (3) collaboration. Each of these modes of practice operates in
tension with a core feature of legality.
a. Informality
Proactive lawyering contrasts with legality in its emphasis on
informality. Its processes call for flexibility and adaptability in both
roles and modes of thinking, and the capacity to tailor the mode of
reasoning and relationship to the demands of the situation. Its modes of
thought and action emphasize adaptability rather than adherence to
established procedures. Whereas legality calls for prescribed modes of
interaction and relationships defined by roles, non-legalistic processes
rely on effective communication, experimentation, and interactions that
build understanding, learning, and the capacity to work together. The
modes of interaction are designed to encourage relationships that foster
trust and connection. Participation is defined not by formal status (party,
attorney of record, judge) but by the stake an individual might have in
addressing an issue and their power to affect the desired outcome (either
positively or negatively). Structure serves the role of facilitating
purposeful and effective informal interaction rather than prescribing the
modes of interaction and decision-making.
b. Legitimacy grounded in efficacy
Proactive lawyering prioritizes efficacy—defined as the ability to
produce a desired or intended result, to enable problem-solving and the
achievement of goals.88 The gaze is forward-looking rather than
backward-looking, and focused on impact rather than predictability.89
Problem-solving is integral to proactive lawyering;90 it requires
facilitating a process of understanding, specifying, diagnosing, and
seeking to achieve the desired state.91 This role corresponds to Robert
Cover’s capacious definition of law as the relationship between the “is,”
the “ought,” and the “what might be.”92
88. The dictionary definition of efficacy is the ability to achieve the desired result. The
focus on achieving desired outcomes is central to the definition of lawyers as problem solvers.
See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); Sturm, From Gladiators to
Problem Solvers, supra note 2.
89. William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge
to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 177-78 (2004) (describing a pragmatist
turn that emphasizes desired impact in the future, rather than remediation of rights violations,
emphasized by legal liberalism).
90. Problem solving is the first skill identified in the MacCrate Report setting out key
lawyering competencies. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 135.
91. Brest & Krieger, supra note 78, at 812.
92. Cover, supra note 6, at 10.
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Proactive lawyering’s inquiry is exploratory rather than
adjudicative: how can the lawyer or decision-maker facilitate the
achievement of goals and the furtherance of purposes? What will it take
to effectuate the desired outcome? What actually will work to address
the problem, rather than what category or legal significance does this
problem involve?93 This mode of engagement relies on creativity,
innovation, imagination, and the strategic use of information to craft
effective solutions and resolutions that satisfy the participants and meet
the demands of the situation. 94 Power stems not from authority and the
capacity to enlist coercion but instead from influence, persuasiveness,
and demonstrated capacity to achieve desired outcomes.95
c. Collaboration
Proactive lawyering prioritizes collaboration. Its success depends
on enabling people affected by, interested in, and responsible for an issue
to work together, even across competing interests and opposing
positions.96
Processes like learning from failure, deliberation,
experimentation, design thinking, problem-solving, and innovation get
their power from bringing diverse perspectives together to learn with and
from each other. They call for engaging with difference not as a way to
evaluate the merits of each but instead to enable effective learning from
peers, adversaries, and outsiders, and interacting that enables creative
solutions and effective implementation. Trust is a necessary lubricant of
these interactions.97

93. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5
NEV. L.J. 347, 367 (2004) (describing the role of lawyers in deliberative problem solving and
building consensus based solutions that meet stakeholders’ needs); Rakoff & Minow, supra
note 22, at 602 (lawyers need “the ability to generate the multiple characterizations, multiple
versions, multiple pathways, and multiple solutions, to which they could apply their very well
honed analytic skills”); Simon, supra note 89, at 179-80 (emphasizing a focus on future
collective benefit rather than compensation for past wrongdoing).
94. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 151-52.
95. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 110-16 (1992).
96. See HEINEMAN, LEE & WILKINS, supra note 12, at 15 (“We need lawyers who are
not just strong individual contributors but who have the ability to work cooperatively and
constructively in groups or on teams that are increasingly diverse and multidisciplinary—and
who can lead these teams effectively.”); Cohen, supra note 86, at 503 (showing how new
governance and negotiation practice together connect problem solving techniques to building
citizen participation and new governance).
97. Amy Cohen’s description of juvenile and family courts identifies informality,
conciliation, and anti-adversarialism as characteristics enabling these courts to provide “social
justice” in contrast to “legal justice,” provides an example of the contrast between legality and
proactive law and lawyering. See Cohen, supra note 75.
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These three features of proactive lawyering described above form a
logic that operates in tension with that of legality. Legality’s dualities
are summarized below:
Adjudicatory Lawyering
Formality
Authority
Adversarialism

Proactive Lawyering
Informality
Efficacy
Collaboration

II. WHAT MAKES LAWYERING PARADOXICAL?
Law and lawyering call for both adjudicatory and proactive
lawyering, as exhibited by the previous section. Yet, these opposite
modes of thought, interaction, and experience sometimes operate at
cross-purposes and even contradict each other. These opposing mindsets
and practices are nonetheless interdependent and mutually constitutive.
In short, they are paradoxical.
Although students and scholars alike have observed the tensions
built into lawyering,98 the significance of their paradoxical nature has
been largely overlooked. A burgeoning literature demonstrates that
paradoxes operate as a particular form of duality that affect how those
tensions are experienced and whether they will undermine or facilitate
the pursuit of both sides of the duality.99 The paradox lens thus offers a
conceptual tool for engaging productively with the tensions between
legality and proactive lawyering, paving the way for the practical
strategies set out in Part IV.100

98. See, e.g., CULLEN, supra note 4; PHILIP C. KISSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW
SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF MODERN LAWYERS (2003) (describing paradoxes in legal
education, identifying practices at cross-purposes, and holding out little hope for significant
change); RHODE, supra note 19; Richard, supra note 11.
99. See, e.g., Wendy K. Smith, Marianne W. Lewis, Paula Jarzabkowski & Ann Langley,
Introduction: The Paradoxes of Paradox, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL
PARADOX 1 (Wendy K. Smith et al. eds., 2017) (ebook); LINDA A. HILL ET AL., COLLECTIVE
GENIUS: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF LEADING INNOVATION (2014); BARRY JOHNSON,
POLARITY MANAGEMENT: IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS, at viii
(4th ed. 2014); Moshe Farjoun, Beyond Dualism: Stability and Change as a Duality, 35 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 202-25 (2010); Charles A. O’Reilly III & Michael L. Tushman, Ambidexterity
as a Dynamic Capability: Resolving the Innovator’s Dilemma, 28 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. 185 (2008); SMITH & BERG, supra note 14; Wendy K. Smith & Marianne W. Lewis,
Toward a Theory of Paradox: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Organizing, 36 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 381 (2011).
100. Scholars and commentators have sometimes used other language to describe a similar
phenomenon, including “polarities,” JOHNSON, supra note 99, at 270; “dualities,” Farjoun,
supra note 99, at 205; contradictions, “dilemma,” “dichotomy,” and “dialectics,” Smith &
Lewis, supra note 99, at 385.
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In the legal and scholarly literature about lawyering, the term
“paradox” is often used interchangeably with “dilemma,” but these two
dualities have very different implications for how to proceed.101 A
dilemma is a necessary choice between mutually exclusive alternatives,
each with advantages and disadvantages.102 Bernard Williams uses the
example of a comfortably seated person who is both lazy and thirsty.103
The person could grab drinks located elsewhere, but that would mean
exerting energy and giving up their comfortable position.104 An either/or
choice must be made. Unlike a dilemma, a paradox involves truths that
are contradictory but interdependent rather than mutually exclusive.
Peter Elbow, a scholar of teaching and learning, offers an example of a
paradox in the context of teaching and learning: “students seldom learn
well unless they give in or submit to teachers. Yet, they seldom learn
well unless they resist or even reject their teachers.”105 As a paradox,
this tension cannot be resolved; the demand for the contradictory
elements is built into the situation.
The tension between individuals and groups illustrates the
potentially paralyzing impact of paradoxes. Kenwyn Smith and David
Berg have shown that groups become strong and resourceful only if the
individuality of their members is expressed.106 Individual expression,
however, sparks group conflict—that is, conflict capable of fostering
novel understandings and disrupting group decision-making and
performance.107 Each method of disposing of the conflict gives rise to a
new set of tensions; the attempt to unravel these contradictory forces
creates a circular process that can be paralyzing to groups.108 Smith and
Berg also show that paradoxes can become a source of learning and
change.109
101. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 19; MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Scott L. Cummings, Introduction:
What Good Are Lawyers?, in THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 1 (Scott L. Cummings ed., 2011).
102. Caroline Christof, The Possibility of Moral Paradox, 2 POLYMATH 40, 40 (2012)
(“[I]n a moral dilemma, a person is forced to choose one obligation over another and to elect
the best course of action.”).
103. Bernard A. Williams & W.F. Atkinson, Ethical Consistency, 39 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES 103, 104 (1965).
104. Id.
105. Elbow, supra note 14, at 65. This “authority paradox” resembles the justice
paradoxes, explored more fully in infra Section II.E.
106. SMITH & BERG, supra note 14, at 90-93, 102.
107. See Charles Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a Volatile
Economy, 46 HUM. REL. 1133, 1145-46 (1993).
108. SMITH & BERG, supra note 14, at xxxii-xxxiii, 225.
109. Id. at 215-16, 222-24; see also JOHNSON, supra note 99; Smith & Lewis, supra
note 99, at 391-93.
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The first step in putting the paradox concept to work is to
understand how paradoxes are operating. This Section aims to facilitate
that understanding by naming the recurring paradoxes facing lawyers,
and what makes them both conflicting and interdependent—that is,
paradoxical. Drawing on the scholarly literature, teaching experience,
and field research, I have identified five lawyering paradoxes that stem
from the opposing yet interdependent features of legalistic and proactive
lawyering: (1) paradoxes of thought; (2) relationship; (3) motivation; (4)
mindset; and (5) justice.
A. Thought Paradoxes: Methodological Skepticism v. Methodological
Possibility
The modes of thought characterizing legality as compared to
proactive lawyering could be thought of as two competing
methodologies, or systematic ways of thinking about issues or
challenges lawyers face.110 Legality employs a methodology of
skepticism, emphasizing critical thinking, logic, categorization,
argumentation, vigilance, detachment, evaluation, and judgment.
Proactive lawyering employs a methodology of possibility, emphasizing
creativity, intuition, seeing patterns, learning from difference,
innovation, empathy, experimentation, openness, and synthesis. 111 The
methodologies of skepticism and possibility thus pull in different
directions in their thought processes, aims, emotional valence, and role
expectations.112

110. This discussion of competing methodologies is inspired by Elbow’s articulation of
competing methodologies he detected in the context of teaching and learning. He defines
“methodological doubt” as “the systematic, disciplined, and conscious attempt to criticize
everything no matter how compelling it might seem–to find flaws or contradictions we might
miss” and “methodological belief” as “the equally systematic, disciplined and conscious
attempt to believe everything no matter how unlikely or repellent it might seem—to find
virtues and strengths we might otherwise miss. Both derive their power from the very fact that
they are methodological.” Elbow, supra note 14, at 257-58.
111. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 51-52 (2011). A methodology
of possibility draws on what Kahneman calls System 1 thinking. Those characteristics include
generating impressions, feelings, and inclinations, suppresses doubt, cognitive ease, and
associative thinking. Id. at 51-52.
112. Duncan Kennedy’s pathbreaking work also informs this typology. Kennedy
juxtaposes the hermeneutic of suspicion vs. hermeneutic of restoration. Duncan Kennedy, A
Social Psychological Interpretation of the Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary Legal
Thought 1-3 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931428; Duncan
Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary Legal Thought, 25 L. & CRITIQUE
91, 106-07 (2014). For a discussion of the mechanisms that account for the oppositional
character of these modes of thought, see KAHNEMAN, supra note 111, at 24-26; TERESA
AMABILE & STEVEN KRAMER, THE PROGRESS PRINCIPLE: USING SMALL WINS TO IGNITE
JOY, ENGAGEMENT, AND CREATIVITY AT WORK 31 (2011).
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Legality’s mode of argument and decision-making is logical,
analytical, and backward-looking.113 As a popular text on legal
reasoning and writing observes:
Your documents will be read by judges and supervising lawyers who
must make decisions based on what you have written. They won’t
read out of general curiosity. They are decisional readers and need
you to be a decisional writer . . . Your readers are skeptical by nature
and for good reason. Skepticism helps them make better decisions.
Their job is to look for weaknesses in your analysis. If they find any,
your writing is not helpful to them, and they will react negatively to
it. But if your readers can’t find any weaknesses, they will rely on
you, respect you as a professional, and be grateful for your
guidance.114

Legality requires careful thinkers who are what Daniel Kahneman calls
engaged System 2 thinkers:115 “alert, intellectually active, less willing to
be satisfied with superficially attractive answers, and more skeptical
about their intuitions.”116 The discipline of analysis and interpretation
holds legal thinkers to institutionally authorized forms of reasoning that
respect institutional roles and rules.117
A methodology of skepticism thus prioritizes effort, sustained
attention, reasoning, and slow thinking required to “construct thought in
an orderly series of steps” through criticism, caution, making
comparisons, planning, exercising choice, and “checking the validity of
a complex logical argument.”118
Legality also explicitly invites—indeed, requires—judgment and
evaluation. Adjudicatory lawyering harnesses ceremonial contest—
using dialogue to get ideas or propositions to wrestle with one another
so as to expose contradictions in what had been assumed.119 It proceeds
by placing conduct and people into categories and attaching judgment to
those categories. Legal inquiry determines fault. Decision-making
involves isolating cause and allocating responsibility to one side as
opposed to another. It casts parties as opposing and invites each party
to focus on the weaknesses of the other side’s position. It proceeds by
113. See supra Section I.A.
114. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ELLIE MARGOLIS & KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL
REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 58 (9th ed. 2021).
115. System 2 is “the conscious reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides
what to think about and what to do.” KAHNEMAN, supra note 111, at 21.
116. Id. at 46.
117. See MICHELE DESTEFANO & GUENTHER DOBRAUZ, NEW SUITS: APPETITE FOR
DISRUPTION IN THE LEGAL WORLD 96-98 (2019).
118. KAHNEMAN, supra note 111, at 21, 22.
119. This aspect of methodological skepticism is not unique to legal analysis, see Elbow,
supra note 14, at 262. However, conventional legal analysis privileges this mode of thought.
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narrowing the areas of dispute and reaching a clear, singular, and
unequivocal outcome. This mode of thought undergirds legality’s
relationship to rule-of-law values. It disciplines the exercise of power,
cabins discretion, and clothes legal decision-making with the imprimatur
of principles over personal biases.120
Rules, precedent, and authority serve to justify the use of force to
back up legal decisions.121 Robert Cover’s path-breaking work
illuminated this relationship between violence and law’s legitimation:
“Beginning with broad interpretive categories such as ‘blame’ or
‘punishment,’ meaning is created for the event which justifies the judge
to herself and to others with respect to her role in the acts of violence.”122
Legality thus allows decision-makers to justify imposing decisions with
serious consequences, including violence.
Proactive lawyering, in contrast, calls for contextual,
forward-looking and creative thinking.123 This mode of thought is
sometimes called lateral thinking; moving beyond purely linear,
analytical thought and shifting mental paradigms.124 “The lateral
thinking attitude involves firstly a refusal to accept rigid patterns and
secondly an attempt to put things together in different ways. With lateral
thinking one is always trying to generate alternatives, to restructure
patterns.”125 Proactive lawyering prizes innovation,126 unlike legality,
which privileges authority over efficacy.127
A methodology of possibility draws on what Kahneman calls
System 1 thinking: generating impressions, feelings, and inclinations,
suppresses doubt, cognitive ease, and associative thinking.128 Many of
the texts used to develop proactive lawyering capacities discourage
comparing, categorizing, and assigning responsibility, all of which are

120. See supra Section I.A.
121. Id.
122. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1061, 1608 (1986),
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol95/iss8/7.
123. See supra Section I.B. Metaphor and narrative featuring prominently in the
methodology of possibility, or what Robert Cover calls world-creating or juris generative. See
also Cover, supra note 6, at 12-13, 15; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 78, at 807-08.
124. EDWARD DE BONO, LATERAL THINKING: CREATIVITY STEP BY STEP (2011); see
also Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1995) (describing the importance of story as a
complement to analytical and logical analysis in legal advocacy).
125. DE BONO, supra note 124, at 53.
126. See DESTEFANO & DOBRAUZ, supra note 117, at 97-98.
127. See SCHAUER, supra note 22, at 9-10 (highlighting that thinking like a lawyer means
applying authoritative rules rather than figuring out what might be best under the
circumstances).
128. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 111.
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integral to formal, authority-based thinking.129 Design thinking,
problem-solving, and facilitating difficult conversations explicitly
discourage the critical and backward-looking mode of thought that is the
hallmark of legality. Rather than assigning fault or responsibility, the
modes of thought associated with proactive lawyering promote mapping
joint contributions,130 understanding root causes, and generating
multiple and even conflicting approaches to a problem. The goal of
proactive lawyering is to “understand what actually happened so we can
improve how we work together in the future.”131 Predictability is not
possible or even desired.132
Innovation has been identified as a crucial competency and practice
by design thinkers, experimentalists, and transactional lawyers.133
Proactive lawyering calls for expanding options, understanding
connections, intuition, and legal imagination, a form of thinking that
enables its practitioners to produce a more robust definition of the
problem at hand, and a more plural version of possible solutions. Legal
imagination involves “the ability to generate the multiple
characterizations, multiple versions, multiple pathways, multiple
solutions” to which students then apply “very well-honed analytic
skills.”134
This mode of thought contrasts with the requirements of legality.
Legality’s skepticism cuts against the more imaginative and
improvisational form of thinking integral to problem-solving,
brainstorming, and design thinking:
Though lawyers tend to make a sport out of shooting down ideas as
quickly and thoroughly as possible—whether it’s because ‘they’ve
been tried before,’ an instinct says that ‘it won’t work,’ or otherwise.
But the designer’s mindset pushes us to explore and test ambitious
ideas before trashing them . . . . We’ve been trained as lawyers to
129. This pattern surfaces in the literature on design thinking, empathetic listening,
interacting across differences, and having difficult conversations. See, e.g., MICHELE
DESTEFANO, LEGAL UPHEAVAL: A GUIDE TO CREATIVITY, COLLABORATION, AND
INNOVATION IN LAW (2018); MARSHALL B. ROSENBERG, NONVIOLENT COMMUNICATION:
A LANGUAGE OF LIFE (3d ed. 2015); CAROLYN GROSE & MARGARET E. JOHNSON,
LAWYERS, CLIENTS & NARRATIVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR LAW STUDENTS AND
PRACTITIONERS 56-62 (2017); DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON & SHEILA HEEN,
DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT MATTERS MOST (10th-anniversary ed.
2010); Perry-Kessaris, supra note 11; Margaret Hagan, Law By Design, LAW BY DESIGN,
http://www.lawbydesign.co/en/home/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
130. STONE, PATTON & HEEN, supra note 129, at 78-79.
131. Id. at 60.
132. TIM BROWN, CHANGE BY DESIGN: HOW DESIGN THINKING TRANSFORMS
ORGANIZATIONS AND INSPIRES INNOVATION 17 (2009).
133. Hagan, supra note 129; Perry-Kessaris, supra note 11.
134. .Rakoff & Minow, supra note 22, at 602.
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poke holes and give critiques, but often that stops us from creating
new things or supporting others who are doing so.135

Authors seeking to cultivate this mindset of creativity, empathy, and
possibility explicitly caution against the methodology of skepticism
called for by legality. They emphasize the imperative of not judging,
not blaming, not comparing or categorizing, and not assigning
responsibility. In Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters
Most, a book widely used in negotiations classes and in training lawyers,
the authors designate the “blame frame” as “a bad idea” that will get in
the way of handling a difficult conversation.136 Proving we are right gets
in the way of “understanding the perceptions, interpretations, and values
of both sides.”137 The goal is to move away from judging the truth of
each party’s position, establishing who is right and who is wrong, or
allocating blame. Talking about fault “produces disagreement, denial,
and little learning. It evokes fears of punishment and insists on an
either/or answer,”138 (the essence of the adversarial process). Blame and
responsibility “distract us from exploring why things went wrong and
how we might correct them going forward.”139 Instead, the methodology
of possibility calls for systematic effort to see and experience the ideas
of others as the speaker does, to listen with appreciation. This mode of
inquiry “forces us to enter into unfamiliar or threatening ideas instead of
just arguing against them without experiencing them or feeling their
force.”140
These differing modes of thought produce different default modes
of communication. Legality proceeds through argumentation and
advocacy. The form of communication also reflects law’s formality.
Dialogue within legal interactions has an instrumental purpose. It
produces the facts and law needed to advocate, persuade, and decide.
Clients and witnesses—those who directly experience the interactions
giving rise to the facts—supply that information to the formal actors who
turn those experiences into facts that become the focus of analysis. The
focus of attention is on questions such as: What rule or principle applies
to this situation? What category does this situation fit into? How does
135. Hagan, supra note 129, at Design Mindsets.
136. STONE, PATTON & HEEN, supra note 129, at 59.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 11-12.
139. Id. at 12.
140. Elbow, supra note 14, at 263. The emphasis is not on trying to construct or defend
an argument but rather to transmit an experience or enlarge a vision. This mode of thought
asks, “not what are your arguments in support of a [silly] belief,” but instead “[g]ive me the
vision in your head. You are having an experience I don’t have: help me to have it.” Id. at
261.
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this situation or actor compare to other situations that have previously
been decided? What are the problems with this argument? What have
other courts or authoritative sources previously decided and with what
reasoning?
This mode of communication invites “level 1” or “focused
listening.” 141 The spotlight is one’s own thoughts, judgments, and
conclusions. Listening serves to get the information needed to decide
how to use or act on what one learns from another person, on what that
information means for your own positions, evaluation, or response. The
focus of awareness is on the relationship of the facts to relevant legal
categories.142 The thought process proceeds by comparing the situation
at hand to other situations to determine their legal significance. The
purpose of this analysis is evaluation and judgment. The structure,
timing, and purpose of interactions flow from the aim of evaluating and
judging for the purposes of producing a decision. The personal stories
underlying the facts presented in legal decisions matter only in so far as
they relate to the relevant legal categories.143
For interactions aimed at building a relationship, difficult
conversations, designing innovative solutions, or solving problems,
however, arguing “is not helpful . . . [It] inhibits with the ability to learn
how the other person sees the world.”144 In contrast, the practices of
proactive lawyering invite “a move from certainty to curiosity, from
debate to exploration, from simplicity to complexity.”145 This stance of
curiosity is embraced in design thinking, conflict resolution, coaching,
systems thinking, and problem-solving. The purpose of inquiry is
understanding, integrating, and making sense of differing perspectives.
Communication adopts a both/and, rather than a yes/but stance. Even if
you are convinced you are right, the conversation is not about
establishing who’s right. The focus is on working out a way to connect
that will enable you to move forward.
141. HENRY KIMSEY-HOUSE ET AL., CO-ACTIVE COACHING: CHANGING BUSINESS,
TRANSFORMING LIVES 33-34 (3d ed. 2011) (introducing level 1 listening as a focus on what
the information means to the listener); Susan Sturm, Listening 1 Pager (2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
142. Lawyers are expected to convert legal theories to factual propositions, as part of
developing the arguments they might present to adversaries’ lawyers, judges, juries,
arbitrators, or mediators. DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 83 (4th ed. 2019).
143. MERTZ, supra note 22, at 9 (“When handed a case to read, you now automatically
check to see what the court did in reaching its decision. Poignant, glaring, pitiful stories of
human drama and misery begin to sail easily past you, as you take them expertly in hand and
dissect them for the ‘relevant’ facts.”).
144. STONE, PATTON & HEEN, supra note 129, at 26, 29.
145. Id. at 37.
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The methodology of possibility thus calls for Level 2 or focused
listening and Level 3 or global listening.146 The idea is not to categorize
but instead to understand, learn, and see the possibility for two stories
that conflict and still coexist. Design thinking also calls for this focus
on communicating to learn about and engage intended beneficiaries: “to
deliver to [them] something that will be useful and usable to them, first
[you] need to understand them. This means caring deeply about their
needs, their values, and their behavior.”147 Rather than engaging in
arguments and counterarguments, this approach invites questions such
as: “what’s interesting or helpful about the view? What are some of the
intriguing features that others might not have noticed? What would you
notice if you believe this view? If it were true? In what sense or under
what conditions might this idea be true?”148
The aims of adjudicatory as compared to proactive modes of
thought pull in different directions. Legality aims to produce a single,
certain right answer, a singularity of meaning that will decide a particular
conflict. Its aim is to narrow the scope of the dispute and settle on a
single answer that disposes of the conflict. Proactive lawyering, at least
at some stage of the process, generates multiple possibilities.149
The emotional valence associated with the methodology of
skepticism (critique and analysis) also conflicts with the emotions
associated with the methodology of possibility (creativity and
imagination). There is growing evidence that:
[G]ood mood, intuition, creativity, gullibility, and increased reliance
on System 1 form a cluster. At the other pole, sadness, vigilance,
suspicion, an analytic approach, and increased effort also go
together. A happy mood loosens the control of System 2 over
performance: when in a good mood, people become more intuitive
and more creative but also less vigilant and more prone to logical
errors . . . . Cognitive ease is both a cause and a consequence of a
pleasant feeling.150

“Recent research has also revealed that emotions can have both positive
and negative effects on a range of work behaviors, including creativity,

146. See KIMSEY-HOUSE, supra note 141, at 36, 38 (“At Level II, there is a sharp focus
on the other person. . . Level II listening is the level of empathy, clarification, collaboration. . .
When you listen at Level III, you listen as though you . . .were surrounded by a force field.”).
147. Stephanie Dangel, Margaret Hagan & James Bryan Williams, Reimagining Today’s
Legal Education for Tomorrow’s Lawyers, in MAPPING LEGAL INNOVATION: TRENDS AND
PERSPECTIVES 383, 391 (Antoine Masson & Gavin Robinson eds., 2021).
148. Elbow, supra note 14, at 275.
149. Both use analogy, but for different and, in some respects, conflicting purposes.
150. KAHNEMAN, supra note 111, at 69.
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decision making, and negotiations.”151 For example, positive feelings
can lead to greater flexibility in problem solving and negotiations.152 By
contrast, negative emotions narrow and restrict the social and cognitive
environment; at the same time, they facilitate careful and unbiased
judgment.153
Notwithstanding their oppositional relationship, methodological
skepticism and methodological possibility depend upon each other for
their successful realization and even give rise to their opposite twin even
as they resist that call. Judgment and evaluation require the input of
accurate and reliable information that can only be obtained through
forms of inquiry that do not prejudge or evaluate, and that employ
empathy, appreciate listening, and learning.154 Clear rules and
boundaries can, under certain conditions, actually enable creativity.
Linear and logical analysis alone cannot reach a resolution in situations
of ambiguity and competing values, at least if it is to proceed with
integrity and legitimacy.
Critical legal scholars, legal process scholars, and pragmatic
lawyers alike have called for incorporating the methodology of
possibility into adjudication’s methodology of skepticism. Roberto
Unger shows that conventional legal analysis leads to discovering the
limits of legal analysis and the dependence on more proactive and
imaginative modes of thought:
When we begin to explore ways of ensuring the practical conditions
for the effective enjoyment of rights, we discover at every turn that
there are alternative plausible ways of defining these conditions, and
then of satisfying them once they have been defined. For every such
conception, there are different plausible strategies to fulfill the
specified conditions . . . . Thus, a method designed to vindicate
conceptual unity and institutional necessity revealed unimagined
diversity and opportunity in established law.155

Hard cases—where existing precedent cannot resolve value conflicts
that would produce different outcomes—introduce the necessity of
generating (and then choosing between) multiple plausible ways of
proceeding or prioritizing values. The multiplicity of possibilities, in
151. AMABILE & KRAMER, supra note 112, at 31.
152. Barbara Fredrickson provides research associating positive emotions—such as joy,
amusement and interest—with broadening perspectives; they build social and intellectual
resources. See generally BARBARA L. FREDRICKSON, POSITIVITY: DISCOVER THE UPWARD
SPIRAL THAT WILL CHANGE YOUR LIFE (2009).
153. KAHNEMAN, supra note 111, at 60, 65.
154. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 66, at 2-4; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 24,
at 151-52.
155. UNGER, supra note 28, at 28-29, 42.
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turn, generates a need for resolution among those possibilities, either to
enable progress toward a goal or to resolve conflicts.
Thought paradoxes also cut in the opposite direction: the
methodology of possibility requires engagement with the methodology
of skepticism to succeed. Critical feedback is crucial to learning and
improvement, even as it discourages the disclosures necessary to enable
that critique to happen. Intuition and creativity are susceptible to bias,
which requires a methodology of skepticism as a form of
accountability.156 Design thinking, innovation, and problem-solving
require boundaries to enable creativity, as well as ways to deal with
conflict that cannot be resolved through dialogue. Researchers have
documented the critical role of boundaries, limits, and rules in setting the
conditions that enable creativity.157 Indeed, design thinking makes
explicit the need for both types of thinking by calling first for flaring–
the generation of ideas without critique and then for funneling–critical
analysis of those ideas (even as it generally fails to address the tensions
between them).158
Thought paradoxes are built into law at the level of the meaning,
structure, and operation of law. Law operates through the simultaneous
operation of practices and precepts that create the possibility for creative
and cooperative action, while also affording the vehicle for preventing
destructive conflict by imposing general norms backed by the force of
the state.
Lawyers operating within conventional legal thought are called
upon both to accept the constraints of conventional legal analysis even
when those constraints operate against problem-solving, while they are
also called upon to find ways to solve the problems that clients bring to
them. As problems increase in complexity and the limits of rule-based
solutions become more evident, lawyers operating in both the public and
private sectors occupy positions that call for creativity alongside
critique.159
156. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31 (2007) (“[I]ntuitive, heuristic-based
decision making led the judges to make erroneous decisions that they probably would have
avoided had they adopted a deliberative approach.”).
157. See O’Reilly & Tushman, supra note 99, at 188; Elbow, supra note 14; KAHNEMAN,
supra note 111, at 99.
158. Olga Trusova, Dealing with Ambiguity: Flaring and Focusing for Creative
Problem-Solving, MEDIUM: STAN. D.SCH. (Nov. 29, 2020), https://medium.com/stanford-dschool/dealing-with-ambiguity-flaring-and-focusing-for-creative-problem-solving6b3a5f6d6ead (“Creativity requires divergent thinking and convergent thinking, two distinct
modes that imply different behaviors . . . .”); Perry-Kessaris, supra note 11, at 110.
159. Raymond H. Brescia, Creative Lawyering for Social Change, 35 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 529, 531 (2019).
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Thus, although conventional 1L curriculum and jurisprudence
equate “thinking like a lawyer” with the thought processes of legality,
lawyering actually involves a broader and sometimes conflicting array
of thought processes that depend upon each other for their effective
operation.160
B. Relationship Paradoxes: Strategic vs. Trust-based
A second set of paradoxes built into lawyer’s roles involves the
tension between strategic and trust-based relationships. Legality and
proactive lawyering promote different and sometimes conflicting yet
intertwined practices and assumptions related to relationships. Legality,
as rehearsed in the conventional law school classroom and the formal
legal system, relies upon formal roles to define the contours and purpose
of relationships. Relationships are instrumental, defined by formal roles
and legal interests. Students are invited to step into the shoes of various
legal personae; the relationships they develop both in the class and with
the roles they play reflect the characters and settings defined by the
“distinctively legal drama.”161 Selves are conceived, and relevant
characteristics are defined by their relationship to the legal problem.
Elizabeth Mertz documents this pattern of identity formation in the
first-year classroom:
As people in the cases become parties (i.e. strategic actors on either
side of the legal argument), they are stripped of social position and
specific context, located in geography of legal discourse and
authority. Their gender, race, class, occupational, and other
identities become secondary to their ability to argue that they have
met various aspects of legal texts. These contextual factors do
sometimes become salient to the discussions, but only as
ammunition in just this way.162

Classroom discourse “models a split between the selves with which
[they] approach problems: there is the personal opinion, which [they]
hold in abeyance and over which they exercise control, and there is the
professional response, which is ‘agnostic’ and whose primary goal is
honing the students’ discursive power.”163 Students are encouraged “to

160. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and
Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 103 (2001) (“The creative legal
problem solver, then, must learn to navigate within the seas of optimistic creativity, the swells
of dynamic interaction with others (client and other counsel and parties) and the oceans of
realistic legal possibility.”).
161. MERTZ, supra note 22, at 97.
162. Id. at 131.
163. Id. at 122.
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adopt a new, more distanced attitude toward morality and emotion.”164
Their effectiveness turns on their ability to strategize and make
arguments, and to channel discomfort or emotion into arguments.165
Relationships also have an instrumental character to them, defined by
the purpose of the interaction. Dialogue is both central and scripted, with
the lawyer and the judge setting the terms, flow, and areas of inquiry.
Lawyer/client relationships (and currency of time for measuring value)
set clear boundaries on the form, purpose, and scope of interactions, both
between the lawyer and the client and among adversaries. Students learn
to see and be able to argue both sides of an argument and to recognize
the strengths and weaknesses of their own argument from the perspective
of the other side.
Legality’s ideal is “blind justice”—dispassionate application of
rules to objectively determined facts, with decisions governed by reason
rather than politics or emotion. Legality operates to maintain distance
and minimize vulnerability and expression of emotion.166 Emotional
distancing enables lawyers and judges to exercise their roles requiring
them to witness and even cause human pain, and thus both cope and
escape responsibility:
The judicial conscience is an artful dodger and rightfully so. Before
it will concede that a case is one that presents a moral dilemma, it
will hide in the nooks and crannies of the professional ethics, run to
the cave of role limits, seek the shelter of separation of powers.167

Conflict is managed indirectly by intermediaries, with the emphasis on
producing a result that is favorable to the client or that warrants respect
and adherence, rather than achieving understanding or reshaping the
nature of the relationship among the parties. Those with a direct stake
in the outcome of the legal context rely on representatives to speak on
their behalf. Trust and legitimacy come from the fulfillment of role
expectations, the ability to rely on the predictability and accountability
built into the formal relationship, and transparency of the legal process.
Conflict is managed through ritualized processes and representation,
rather than by direct engagement of the stakeholders. Emotions are to
be managed rather than worked through.168
164. Id. at 24.
165. Id. at 124.
166. Oliver R. Goodenough, Institutions, Emotions, and Law: A Goldilocks Problem for
Mechanism Design, 33 VT. L. REV. 395, 401 (2009) (discussing the law’s operation as “a kind
of circuit breaker against emotion-driven responses”).
167. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
201 (1975).
168. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2014 (2010) (documenting the resistance to using law as a vehicle for
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Proactive lawyering, in contrast, prioritizes building relationships
of trust that enable people to work together, disclose sensitive
information, share perspectives, and have difficult conversations. The
development of mutual trust is key to lawyers’ counseling and advising
roles, as well as to structuring productive interactions that can achieve
mutual aims. 169 Mobilizing people to achieve a common goal requires
cultivating self-awareness and informal relationships in which people
seek to connect, engage openly with emotions and needs, develop
empathy, and build trust.
Effective collaboration calls for authenticity, connection,
credibility, and empathy.170 Proactive lawyering treats emotion as a
driver of self-awareness, creativity, inspiration, and understanding. It
calls for the willingness to take risks, which in turn both requires and
builds relational trust. This calls for engaging with your own emotions
and those of others, understanding your own and others’ needs, seeing
how aspects of experience beyond reason and rationality affect the way
we think and act, and learning how to “have your feelings or they will
have you.”171
Domains where proactive lawyering predominates explicit call
upon lawyers to understand and address human needs. New governance
and negotiation “share methodological and normative commitments to
purposive human development, to an expansive imagination of human
possibilities, to the idea that these possibilities are expansive because
human desires are dynamic and produced through social interaction.172
Design thinking asks lawyers to develop mutual relationships where
stakeholders speak in the first person and share their interests and needs:
Being user-centered means Being Participatory, looping in
stakeholders into your process. You can have the people you’re
working with join you in trying to create new solutions. Rather than

engaging emotion); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Learning from Conflict: Reflections on
Teaching about Race and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531 (2003); BINDER ET AL., supra note
142, at 11-17 (grounding the need to address emotions in the outcome goals to be achieved
through the adversary process).
169. Sabel, supra note 107, at 1133 (defining trust as “the mutual confidence that no party
to an exchange will exploit the other’s vulnerability”); Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A
Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1742 (2006).
170. See Bill George et al., Discovering Your Authentic Leadership, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Feb. 2007, at 4-7; see also RHODE, supra note 19, at 31.
171. STONE, PATTON & HEEN, supra note 129, at 85; ROSENBERG, supra note 129, at 37,
46 (emphasizing the importance of developing a fuller vocabulary for feelings); Abrams &
Keren, supra note 168, at 2004 (“Efforts to exile affective response—a damaging outgrowth
of historic dichotomizing—can produce legal judgments that are shallow, routinized,
devaluative, and even irresponsible.”).
172. Cohen, supra note 86, at 517.

214

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

you playing the all-powerful expert who will solve their problems
for them, the participatory approach means deferring to your users
and other experts at key moments. The users’ voices should drive
your work.173

In contrast with legality’s de-emphasis on identity, client-centered
lawyering encourages recognizing and actively engaging with cultural
differences.174 Proactive lawyering generally highlights the role of
developing empathy, which is a different kind of perspective-taking than
seeing both sides of an argument. “Empathy involves a shift from my
observing how you seem on the outside, to my imagining what it feels
like to be you on the inside, wrapped in your skin with your set of
experiences and background, and looking out at the world through your
eyes.”175 Empathy, cultivated through reflective practice, is crucial for
proactive lawyers.176 Both enable lawyers to take account of how their
own views and assumptions might color the kind of advice they offer,
assess facts, and prioritize values.177 “Emotion, a potential barrier to
problem solving, when carefully understood and revealed is vulnerable
to a set of strategies designed to enhance productive self-expression.”178
Engaging rather than ignoring emotions enables lawyers to address
needs and values directly so they can be addressed as part of negotiation
and problem-solving.179
Collaboration and team building also call upon lawyers to building
informal relationships that enable trust building:180
Even in highly stressful situations such as litigation, [lawyers]
establish a working relationship whenever possible, including with
their clients and even with opposing counsel and parties. They take
a collaborative, noncompetitive approach to many situations, are
good at listening, and are open to new ideas. [They] use a variety of
information-gathering techniques to gather vital information through
conversation, dialogue, questions, and interaction. They thoroughly
vet their ideas with their colleagues, learn from their adversaries, and
173. Hagan, supra note 129, at Design Mindsets.
174. See GROSE & JOHNSON, supra note 129, at 37-43.
175. STONE, PATTON & HEEN, supra note 129, at 183-84.
176. GROSE & JOHNSON, supra note 129; see MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 24, at 220.
177. GROSE & JOHNSON, supra note 129, at 54-55 (discussing the importance of crosscultural communication in lawyering).
178. Cohen, supra note 86, at 525.
179. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 875, 975 (2003) (“Practical deliberation . . . can work around value differences, and
in the long run, even change them.”).
180. Heidi K. Gardner, Effective Teamwork and Collaboration, in MANAGING TALENT
FOR SUCCESS: TALENT DEVELOPMENT IN LAW FIRMS 145, 145–59 (Rebecca
Normand-Hochman ed., 2013); Sabel, supra note 107 (documenting the malleability of trust
and the conditions that enable trust to develop in repeat relationships).
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collaborate whenever possible. Through inquiry and collaboration,
they develop their own emotional insights and inspire the same
awareness and capacities in their team members.181

Proactive lawyering aims to build the capacity of stakeholders, parties,
communities, and organizations to organize, deliberate, work together,
solve problems, and pursue common goals.182 Collaboration and
relationship building are also important to learning, staying engaged,
being able to work effectively in groups, and fulfilling group-related
functions successfully, including those related to legality.183
Technology, globalization, complexity, and market forces are forcing
private practitioners and public interest lawyers toward collaboration. 184
In Collaborating with the Enemy, Adam Kahane documents the
conventional understanding of collaboration to push adversarialism and
conflict into the shadows, and to proceed as if “we can problem-solve
our way into the future.”185 He shows the paradoxical relationship
between conflict and collaboration—the risk of unconstrained
engaging.186
Conventional collaboration focuses on engaging, and that does not
make room for asserting, so it becomes ossified and brittle; it settles
into a stupor and gets stuck . . . If we embrace harmonious
engagement and reject discordant asserting, we will end up
suffocating the social system we are working with.187

Legality and proactive lawyering thus promote opposite and, in
some respects, conflicting approaches to relationships. Elizabeth Mertz
summarizes the double edge character of this legal mediation of
relationships:

181. CULLEN, supra note 4, at 11.
182. See, e.g., Grinthal, supra note 83, at 41-42; Charles F. Sabel, Beyond
Principal-Agent Governance: Experimentalist Organizations, Learning and Accountability,
4 WETENSCHAPPELIJKE RAAD VOOR HET REGERINGSBELEID [WRR] VERKENNINGEN 173,
176 (2004) (Neth.); Cohen, supra note 86, at 528 (“[I]nnovations, ‘such as benchmarking,
simultaneous engineering, continuous monitoring, error detection and root cause analysis,’
make it possible to devolve decision-making control to ‘civil society actors’ in ways that
promote ‘social learning about the effective pursuit of the broad imprecise goals’ . . . .”)
(citations omitted).
183. AUSTIN, CHU & LIEBMAN, supra note 82, at 4; Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27, at
534; Amy Edmondson, Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams, 44
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 350, 379 (1999).
184. See AUSTIN, CHU & LIEBMAN, supra note 82; DESTEFANO, supra note 129, at 4-10
(documenting the forces impacting the law market).
185. ADAM MORRIS KAHANE, COLLABORATING WITH THE ENEMY: HOW TO WORK WITH
PEOPLE YOU DON’T AGREE WITH OR LIKE OR TRUST, at xii (2017).
186. Id. at 64.
187. Id. at 65.

216

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

On one hand, the approach to legal reading found in law school
classrooms offers students a potentially liberating opportunity to step
into an impersonal, abstract, and objective approach to human conflict.
On the other hand, erasing (or marginalizing) many of the concrete social
and contextual features of these conflicts can direct attention away from
grounded moral understandings, which some critics believe are crucial
to achieving justice.188
The tensions also work in the other direction. The distancing and
detachment required by formality and adversarialism undercut the
trust-building and interpersonal responsibility that is necessary to the
effective implementation of norms.189 William Simon illustrates this
dynamic in his article on the impact of legalization on the welfare
system: while the formalization of AFDC rules and procedures “seem[s]
to have reduced the claimant’s experience of oppressive and punitive
moralism, of invasion of privacy, and of dependence on idiosyncratic
personal favor. . . . [it] also [has] reduced their experience of trust and
personal care and [has] increased their experience of bewilderment and
opacity.”190 Formality also hides from view “the contextual and human
factors that influence how people observe and interpret facts.”191
Robert Cover conveys the irresolvable tension between proactive
lawyering’s organic norm communities and the relationship underlying
legality.192 Legality’s relationship to state power and violence destroys
the normative ties between a judge and those before the court, as well as
those attached to the court’s power:193
[A]s long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as
well as meaning, as long as people are committed to using or
resisting the social organization of violence in making their
interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common
meaning that can be achieved.194

Yet, both types of relationships are necessary for effective
lawyering; law students and lawyers must learn to navigate this tension
between relationships premised on strategic interaction and relationships

188. MERTZ, supra note 22, at 133-34.
189. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2100-01 (1989); Sabel, supra note 107; Sitkin & Bies,
supra note 25, at 349.
190. William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 Yale
L.J. 1198, 1220-21 (1983).
191. See Massaro, supra note 189, at 2101-02.
192. Cover, supra note 122, at 1617.
193. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L. J. 1860,
1894 (1987); KISSAM, supra note 98, at 96.
194. Cover, supra note 122, at 1629.
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oriented around building trust. Adversaries who cannot cooperate are
less effective in making deals and settling cases.195 Effective learning in
law school depends upon being able both to operate in formal public
settings and to build authentic relationships, take the risk of being wrong,
and ask for help when you need it. Lawyers cannot obtain the
information needed to build a case or design a deal without building a
relationship of trust, which requires building empathetic relationships
with clients, with whom they also have a formal and bounded
professional relationship defined by instrumental aims. Litigation both
invites mutual cooperation to avoid the limitations of solutions derived
through adversary process and creates conditions that make cooperation
difficult and even risky.196
Effective lawyering requires both
relationships of trust and the capacity to detach, assert positions, and
fight when necessary.197
C. Motivation Paradoxes: Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation
Legality and proactive lawyering take contrary approaches to
motivating behavior. Legality relies on extrinsic motivation—the desire
for a “separable outcome,” such as a reward or avoidance of a penalty,198
while proactive lawyering emphasizes intrinsic motivation—engaging
people in behavior “because it is interesting, enjoyable, satisfying,
engaging, or personally challenging.”199
Within legality’s logic, the motivation for adhering to norms is
basically extrinsic, in the form of duty, incentives, threats, and
coercion.200 Legality takes a compliance orientation and ultimately
relies on force, or the power of the state to enforce norms and motivate
behavior. Legal actors achieve adherence through the imposition of
legal requirements, the expression of legal duties to comply with those
responsibilities, threats of negative consequences for failing to adhere,
and when necessary, coercion.201
Proactive lawyering, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of
learning, shared purpose, inspiration, and participation as ways to

195. Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 50, at 514.
196. Id. at 521 (“In litigation, where even cooperative behavior occurs in the context of a
competitive environment, the risk of misunderstanding an opponent’s move is significant.”).
197. KAHANE, supra note 185, at 31; Goldberg, supra note 82, at 11-12 (noting strategies
for combining collaborative and adversarial advocacy).
198. Bartlett, supra note 46, at 1934-35.
199. AMABILE & KRAMER, supra note 112, at 34.
200. Id. Extrinsic motivation is “the grasp of what needs to be done and the drive to do it
in order to get something else.” Id. at 33.
201. See references cited supra note 46.
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motivate behavioral change.202 These strategies deploy intrinsic
motivation. Interpersonal commitments are characterized by reciprocal
acknowledgment. Proactive lawyering’s broader roles call for a
different relationship to values and purpose, and highlight the
importance of self-awareness, connecting to values, acting consistently
with purpose, practicing one’s values and principles.203
This tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations also plays
out in the incentive structures shaping law students’ and lawyers’
choices. Many law students came to law school out of genuine and
intrinsic interest in the law and a desire to advance deeply held public
values and positive social change, but experience the pull of extrinsic
motivations (grades, prestige, money) coming from law school and the
legal profession.204 A study of students at Yale Law School documents
this tension between prestige and purpose that many students experience
when they arrive at law school.205 A similar tension operates in private
practice as well.206
The tension between intrinsic and extrinsic ways of motivating
behavior is well documented in legal, psychological, and economic
literature. Scholars have shown that extrinsic motivation in the form of
punishment, threat, carrots, and sticks, can crowd out intrinsic
motivation, which is necessary for changes in behavior required for
compliance with those norms.207 “If extrinsic motivators are extremely
strong and salient, they can undermine intrinsic motivation: when this
happens, creativity can suffer.”208 The reliance on extrinsic motivations
that coerce or induce compliance through threat of sanctions can

202. See supra Section I.B.2 (describing the features of proactive lawyering).
203. See HEINEMAN, LEE & WILKINS, supra note 12, at 64; see also RHODE, supra note
19, at 4, 66-67.
204. See PETE DAVIS, OUR BICENTENNIAL CRISIS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL’S PUBLIC INTEREST MISSION 71 (2017), http://hlrecord.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/OurBicentennialCrisis.pdf; John Bliss, From Idealists to Hired
Guns? An Empirical Analysis of “Public Interest Drift” in Law School, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1973, 2032 (2018); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27 at 535-37.
205. See SUSAN STURM & KINGA MAKOVI, FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL (2015),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/files/FullParticipationintheYaleLaw
Journal_otc6qdnr.pdf.
206. See Cummings, supra note 101, at 1-2.
207. Kristen Underhill has provided a useful analysis of the distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic motivations. See Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace Intrinsic
Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to Confront the Challenge of Motivational
Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. REG. 213, 219-23 (2016).
208. AMABILE & KRAMER, supra note 112, at 35.
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undermine the acceptance of the court’s legitimacy, the willingness to
take risks, and assume responsibility.209
Katherine Bartlett summarized these tensions in an article
analyzing how law affects the internalization of norms related to
discrimination.210
On one hand, law provokes compliance by
“symbolizing a consensus” that may challenge people to think critically
about and perhaps revise biased thoughts. It may reinforce a self-identity
consistent with complying with the law and educate others on what it
means to be a good person. On the other hand, coercion may provoke
resistance when people feel a law is unfair, or when it threatens their
sense of identity or autonomy. Law may also be in a more fundamental
tension with internal motivation: it may crowd out people’s sense of
responsibility to do the right thing in the absence of a coercive rule
backed by a sanction.211
Another text aimed at promoting empathetic interaction puts it this
way: “When we submit to doing something solely for the purpose of
avoiding punishment, our attention is distracted from the value of the
action itself. Instead, we are focusing on the consequences, on what
might happen if we fail to take that action.”212 This leads to “diminished
goodwill on the part of those who comply with our values out of a sense
of either external or internal coercion.”213
Robert Cover’s work places this tension between extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation in the context of a fundamental and unavoidable
tension built into the meaning and structure and operation of law.214 Law
works through the simultaneous operation of practices and precepts that
create the possibility for creative and cooperative action, while also
affording the vehicle for preventing destructive conflict by imposing
general norms backed by the force of the state. This produces an
irreconcilable tension between law’s “jurisgenerative” role in fostering
and promoting creative and organic norm communities (which generate
conflict among those communities) and law’s “jurispathic” role in using

209. Susan Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L. J. 1355,
1394-95 (1991) (documenting the tendency of defendants to resist court-imposed injunctions).
The economic and psychological literature documents “how incentives may have
counterintuitive and counterproductive effects on human behavior.” Underhill, supra note
207, at 215-16; see also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 95, at 50.
210. See Bartlett, supra note 46.
211. See id. at 1937.
212. ROSENBERG, supra note 129, at 188.
213. Id. at 15-16.
214. See NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER
(Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
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violence to enforce order-preserving norms (which undercuts those norm
communities).215
This tension between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is built into
law school, lawyers’ roles, and the legal system. Although the prevailing
culture in many law schools skews that tension in favor of extrinsic
motivations, adult educational theory demonstrates the necessity of both
investing in students’ growth and assessing their performance.216
Likewise, part of law’s value lies in its simultaneous proximity to power
and its responsibility for enhancing value and values.
D. Mindset Paradoxes: Fixed vs. Growth Mindset
These differing constellations of thinking, communicating, and
relating combine to produce competing mindsets with opposing
approaches to conflict, failure, and risk. Within the frame of legality,
conflict is a contest, with a winner and loser. The judicial system (or its
equivalent when mimicked in other settings) is justified as operating as
a theater of competition to displace and defuse violent conflict and
increase the legitimacy of decision-making.217
Within the frame of proactive lawyering, conflict is a function of
inevitable difference, a normal part of human interaction, and an
opportunity for learning and growth. Conflict thus invites efforts to
understand and explore ways to accommodate the feelings, needs, and
requests of each participant in the conflict. Rather than identifying a
winner and loser, the conflict resolution process aims to reframe the
conflict to enable each participant to benefit in some way.
Competing approaches to failure also exemplify the tension
between adjudicatory and proactive logic. In the context of the
adversary process, mistakes and failures matter when they cross a legal
line and make that behavior susceptible to a finding of fault. Thus, fault
and mistakes are either a basis for entitlement to relief or for exposure to
judgment. Failure means losing. Thinking and analysis focus on
whether wrongful behavior occurred, if so whether it could be adjudged
unlawful. Mistakes are to be minimized or avoided because they cause
actionable harm or give rise to liabilities, or adjudged wrongful if they
215. Id. at 112 (“The conclusion emanating from this state of affairs is simple and very
disturbing: there is a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and
the organization of law as meaning.”).
216. See Elbow, supra note 14; Bonita London, Geraldine Downey & Shauna Mace,
Psychological Theories of Educational Engagement: A Multi-Method Approach to Studying
Individual Engagement and Institutional Change, 60 VAND. L. REV. 455, 459-67 (2007)
(discussing the impact of situational and individual factors on students’ reactions to external
stress and competition).
217. See Edelman, supra note 20, at 199-201.
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occur. For a law student, making a mistake on a cold call in class means
not “getting it.”218
In the context of proactive lawyering, failure plays a very different
role. Failure operates as the driver of learning and growth. The
important question is not whether the behavior violated a norm, but
rather, how can the relevant participants learn and change from the
failures and mistakes? The motto of design thinking is “fail early to
succeed sooner.”219 The process of building effective teams and
collaboration requires building conditions of psychological and identity
safety.220 The hallmark of psychological safety is being able to make
mistakes without fear that you will be labeled or judged as a result. The
driver of improvement in new governance is the identification of failures
at the moment they occur by those closest to the problem.221
These different approaches to failure give rise to different
orientations to risk, particularly under conditions of uncertainty.
Legality invites treating legal risk as something to be minimized or
avoided. It’s risky to ask questions when you don’t know the answer or
to act in the face of legal uncertainty. Playing it safe means not taking
actions that could invite litigation or judgment. In contrast, proactive
lawyering calls for treating risk as a necessary part of learning, growth,
and innovation.222
Legality and proactive lawyering also have diametrically opposed
reactions to uncertainty. Legality treats uncertainty as something to be
reduced and managed, and its unavoidability produces pessimism about
law’s capacity to address the issue.223 Proactive lawyering (such as
experimentalism, design thinking, deal-making, and negotiations) takes
a contrary view:
This incompleteness of facts, circumstances, priorities, and
normative benchmarks is not necessarily a challenge to overcome or
even a source of conceptual trouble. To the contrary, it provides the
218. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27, at 523.
219. BROWN, supra note 132, at 174.
220. See Edmondson, supra note 183, at 379; Valerie Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social
Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in
Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008) (showing how
identity threats undermine the performance and sense of belonging of students of color).
221. Simon, supra note 46, at 47.
222. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Law and Leadership, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596, 600 (2006);
DESTEFANO, supra note 129, at 68 (calling for lawyers to adopt an innovator’s mindset in
response to risk); Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem Solvers, supra note 2, at 136 (offering
a problem-solving model that treats risks as part of the problem solving process).
223. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Democratic Experimentalism, in SEARCHING
FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds.,
2017).
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basis for great optimism. It is precisely because interests and
priorities are multiple and shifting rather than fixed and known to
parties in advance of dialogue, that there are vast opportunities for
individuals to innovate, collaborate, and solve very hard
problems.224

Legality’s approach to failure, risk, and conflict coalesces into a
mindset or orientation that corresponds to what Carol Dweck has called
a fixed mindset.225 A fixed mindset equates success and failure with
people’s abilities, which are fixed. Success or failure defines who you
are. Law’s focus invites a fixed mindset by putting people in categories
based on their past behavior and assigning meaning to that person based
on those categories. Failure is equated with being wrong (or at least
being found wrong), and thus with losing. Failure is therefore something
to be avoided.
Individuals with a fixed mindset emphasize compliance, control,
and satisfying expectations—all of which form an important (and
desired) part of law school and legality. That pessimistic tendency has
been defined as both a strength and an occupational hazard. “[T]he
nature of what most lawyers do is that we hunt for the negative in order
to protect our clients.”226 Studies have associated law students with this
tendency to interpret the causes of negative events in stable, global and
internal ways.227 The pessimist will view bad events as unchangeable,
and to approach circumstances with a fixed mindset. The optimist, in
contrast, sees setbacks as temporary, and as a learning opportunity.228
Proactive lawyering both demands and cultivates a growth
mindset.229
Design thinking, experimentalism, mediation and
negotiation, and problem-solving courts all emphasize the importance of
learning and growth, the role of failure as a driver of growth and change,
and the importance of creating environments and relationships that
enable people to take risks, try out new ideas, and share what they don’t
know.
224. Cohen, supra note 86, at 523.
225. CAROL S. DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS 6 (2006); see also
KATHRYNE M. YOUNG, HOW TO BE SORT OF HAPPY IN LAW SCHOOL 109 (2018).
226. Larry Richard, The Mind of the Lawyer Leader, LAW PRAC., Sep./Oct. 2015, at 47,
http://www.lawyerbrain.com/sites/default/files/the_mind_of_the_lawyer_leader_aba
_lpm.pdf.
227. See YOUNG, supra note 225, at 39.
228. See DWECK, supra note 225, at 9-11.
229. See DESTEFANO, supra note 129, at 41; Jay Harrington, A Growth Mindset, Paired
With Daily Deliberate Practice, Is Key to Lawyers’ Business Development Success,
ATTORNEYATWORK (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.attorneyatwork.com/growth-mindset; see
also Matsuda, supra note 5 (describing the resilience needed for lawyers of color to use the
law as a vehicle for transformation).
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As Ben Heineman has noted, success and thriving in both law
school and the legal profession actually requires both mindsets:
We need lawyers who, in making recommendations or decisions, are
capable of assessing all dimensions of risk but who are not
risk-averse. Taking well-considered chances is not a quality of mind
customarily associated with lawyers but is often vital to innovation
and change in the public and private sectors.230

A growth mindset also enables law students to navigate the inevitable
stresses and setbacks that students experience while they learn to “think
like a lawyer.” Yet, when learning and growth fail to produce a
resolution, law and lawyers step in to impose one, using processes
premised on a fixed mindset. Laws’ connection to judgment necessitates
operating within the fixed mindset. That aspect of lawyering fulfills a
core function of the rule of law, as well as a paradoxical relationship with
proactive lawyering’s call for imagination, creativity, and learning from
failure.
E. Justice Paradoxes: Formal vs. Substantive Justice
Finally, legality and proactive lawyering deploy conflicting yet
intertwined conceptions of justice. Substantive injustice is baked into
the legal system itself, even as that system offers tools to challenge an
unjust status quo. Injustices inhere in the origins of the constitution
upholding slavery while affording equality and fair process for some.
From the outset, the formal rules protecting equal justice under law
operate so that the “haves come out ahead,” contributing to the starkly
unequal access to justice pervading our legal system.231
The
methodology of legality is itself not neutral. Legal realists, critical
theorists, critical race theorists, and feminist scholars have identified this
contradiction between formal justice and justice as lived experience in
the world as it actually operates.232
Methods shape substance also through the hidden biases they
contain. A strong view of precedent in legal method, for example,
protects the status quo over the interests of those seeking recognition
of new rights. The method of distinguishing law from considerations

230. See HEINEMAN, LEE & WILKINS, supra note 12, at 15.
231. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 99 (1974).
232. Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 411
(2018) (“[A] central dilemma of liberal law reform projects, caught between a commitment to
the rule of law and status quo arrangements on the one hand, and the desire for substantive
justice and social, economic, and political transformation on the other.”).
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of policy, likewise, reinforces existing power structures and masks
exclusions or perspectives ignored by that law.233

This contradiction exemplifies “the conflict between the commitment to
defining ideals and the acquiescence in the arrangements that frustrate
the realization of those ideals or impoverish their meaning.”234 The
challenge, then, is to figure out “how to maintain a normative
commitment to the rule of law when we can foresee that this
commitment will everywhere be betrayed by the actions of the very
positive legal institutions charged with implementing the rule of law.”235
Although the crisis of legitimacy in the Trump era is recent, the
paradox is at least as old as the Constitution. Robert Cover documented
the tension between positive and moral justice faced by judges charged
with enforcing the law of slavery.236 Martin Luther King powerfully
communicated this dual character of law’s justice in the Letter from the
City of Birmingham Jail.237 King explicitly called it “paradoxical” that
a group that so diligently urges obedience to the laws outlawing
segregation would consciously break the law.238 He proclaimed the
injustice of formal laws that “degrade human personality”:
An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group
compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on
itself. This is difference made legal. By the same token, a just law
is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is
willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal.239

The judicialization of rights has the potential to inscribe inequality into
law and “to amplify conflict and focus attention on it,” and to “transform
physical conflict into verbal disputes,”240 as well as to “give public voice
and force to people previously ignored, to make conflict audible and
unavoidable.”241
Yet, these two conceptions of justice are inextricably linked, even
as they are contradictory. King also depicted the dual-edge character of
formal law’s relationship to substantive justice:

233. Bartlett, supra note 46, at 845.
234. UNGER, supra note 28, at 129.
235. Post, supra note 5.
236. COVER, supra note 167, at 202.
237. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from City of Birmingham Jail, reprinted in
WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 77 (1964), https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birm
ingham.html.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. MINOW, supra note 101, at 293.
241. Id.
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[L]aw and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that
when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously
structured dams that block the flow of social progress . . . . Like a
boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be
opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light,
injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates,
to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion
before it can be cured.242

King sought justice in both senses of the word. It is only by stepping
outside of law to shine a light on law’s injustice that the law can claim
both to be justice and to advance justice. To advance justice in the world
requires stepping outside of legality as currently defined by law and legal
institutions, both to pursue justice outside law and to move legal
institutions closer to a sense of justice as it is actually experienced.
A second dimension of the justice paradox relates to the
contradiction between law as a system of values and law as a value
proposition.243 The profession operates as both, and law schools
similarly embody this tension between purpose and prestige. Here too,
the relationship turns out to be paradoxical. Law’s appeal—to future
lawyers, clients, and change agents—resides in part in its proximity to
power and resources, yet that relationship invites cooptation and
acquiescence in the status quo at the expense of one’s fulfillment.
Thus, lawyers must straddle five paradoxes built into the
relationship between legality and proactive lawyering: (1) thought and
discourse paradoxes, (2) relationship paradoxes, (3) motivation
paradoxes, (4) mindset paradoxes, and (5) justice paradoxes. How law
students and lawyers manage these contradictions will make a big
difference to their effectiveness as lawyers, their fulfillment, and their
connection to advancing justice. The next section explores the limits of
conventional approaches to navigate this tension.
III. THE PERILS OF PARADOX AVOIDANCE
The ability to thrive in law school and in the legal profession—and
to pursue lawyers’ responsibility to advance justice—turns in no small
measure on how students and lawyers fare in navigating the lawyering
paradoxes described in the previous section. Yet for the most part,

242. See King, supra note 237.
243. Cummings, supra note 101, at 1-2 (identifying the tension between making money
and “embracing a code of professionalism defined by a commitment to competence,
independence, and public service” as “a fundamental paradox at the heart of the legal
profession”); Samuel Moyn, Law Schools Are Bad for Democracy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Law-Schools-Are-Bad-for/245334.
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students are left to their own devices to understand and manage these
tensions. Law schools generally pay little attention to this paradoxical
dynamic, its impact on law students, or its implications for responding
to the clarion call for change. Notwithstanding the growing focus on
proactive lawyering, many students and lawyers continue to find
themselves buffeted by the demands of legality and proactive lawyering.
The question for legal education and the legal profession is
whether these lawyering paradoxes will be experienced as
counter-productive—producing vicious cycles, disengagement, and
dysfunction—or dynamic—fueling learning, transformation, and the
capacity to navigate complexity. That difference depends at least in
part on how individuals, contexts, and cultures construct the
relationship between legality and proactive lawyering.
Since attending law school, I have been observing how legal
academics, law students, and the legal profession (including myself in
each of these roles) navigate the tensions between legality and proactive
lawyering. I have been tracking the strategies and the impact informally,
by observing how students experience law school, and more
systematically by examining scholarship about legal education,
conducting qualitative research about law students and lawyers, and
analyzing students’ blog posts about their law school experience.244
This section discusses three problematic approaches to lawyering
paradoxes: (a) crowding out modes of thought in tension with legality,
(b) inviting premature or problematic resolution of ambivalence and
contradictions, and (c) contributing to cynicism about law’s relationship
to justice.
A. Crowding out proactive lawyering
Problems emerge when legality (like one side of any paradox) “tries
to hog the whole bed.”245 Although clinical legal education and
experiential learning opportunities have increased,246 the culture and
currency of many law schools remain focused on mastering

244. See generally STURM & MAKOVI, supra note 205; Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27;
Sturm & Guinier, supra note 168, at 531; Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem Solvers, supra
note 2. I have also coded the blog posts from Lawyering for Change and identified patterns
emerging from those posts. In both Lawyer Leadership and Lawyering for Change, students
post blogs on a weekly basis, inviting reflection about their experience of law and law school,
along with their developing theories of change.
245. Elbow, supra note 14, at 258.
246. See infra Section IV.
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legality.247 In many law schools, the formative first year focuses
almost exclusively on learning legality.248 Adjudication remains the
default mode of inquiry and practice, and court decisions form the
backbone of many upper-level classes. Most casebooks proceed
within the logic of legality. For many law students, most of their
courses emphasize doctrinal analysis. Legality’s modes of thought,
motivations, and discourse often dictate how students learn the law,
even in courses focused on non-adjudicatory settings, such as
legislation and transactional lawyering.249 Non-adjudicatory modes
of thought and practice are referred to as “alternative dispute
resolution.” Learning to “think like a lawyer” prototypically refers
to conventional legal reasoning in adjudicatory settings. 250 The
default mode of assessment in law school (and on the bar exam)
prioritizes issue spotting, legal reasoning, and legal writing.251 Many
law schools grade on a curve, which heightens students’
competitiveness and preoccupation with performance over
learning.252 Researchers have also documented the lasting impact of
this equation of lawyering with legality on how people think about
themselves as lawyers.253
Law schools’ focus on legality at legal education’s defining
moments affects the way many law students and lawyers think and feel
about the competencies and practices related to proactive lawyering.254
Legality’s emphasis on the methodology of skepticism reinforces the
247. The MacCrate report, based on a systematic study of legal education, observed that,
many law schools prioritize legal reasoning skills, and fail to devote attention to proactive
lawyering. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 24.
248. See supra Section I.A.
249. See Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic
Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1569-71 (1988); Howard
Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyers as Portrayed in the
Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1162 n.10
(1990).
250. See supra Section I.A.; Blasi, supra note 124, at 325.
251. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27, at 521-22.
252. See London, Downey & Mace, supra note 216, at 457; Sturm & Guinier, supra note
27, at 519-20.
253. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27, at 527; MERTZ, supra note 22, at 214, 220
(summarizing the tendency of legal education to shift students’ attention from social context,
unmoor them from ethical and social identities, and disconnect them from pursuing values);
UNGER, supra note 28, at 96.
254. See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 22, at 607 (“The template for legal thinking
established in the first year of law school has real staying power.”); Sturm & Guinier, supra
note 27, at 542 (“The structure of courses in the first semester . . . conveys the impression that
appellate litigation and corporate practice constitute law’s core, and that law emerges when
judicial actors interpret the arguments of lawyers, the policies of legislators, or the decision
of administrators.”).
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general tendency to value critical thought over creativity and
imagination.255 This tendency—to remember negatives over positives,
to value criticism over appreciative inquiry, to listen with an ear toward
refuting rather than understanding—exists in any discipline defined by
critical and logical thinking.256 Many students infer from the
pervasiveness of methodological skepticism, particularly in the first year
when they are forming their identities as lawyers, the idea that other
modes of thinking do not count as part of thinking like a lawyer.257
Conventional legal reasoning treats politics, emotion, and intuition as a
departure from logical and rational inquiry, which threatens the
legitimacy of legal decision-making.258
Methodological skepticism becomes self-referential— “the mirror
through which it judges what it is like;” it negates the value of what
cannot be understood through that logic.259 The emphasis on “thinking
like a lawyer” (narrowly defined) leads many students to devalue or
marginalize modes of thought that fall outside legality. Many students
report experiencing a dampening of their engagement with creative or
imaginative thinking and practice. One student in Lawyering for
Change, a first-year elective I teach, reported:
Coming into law school, I was really interested in trying to be
creative in my approach [to] the law and took an expansive view of
lawyering; however, [when] I actually arrived in the law school
environment, that expansive view quickly narrowed down to
accepting what people told me about law school and being a lawyer
and just keeping my head down and getting my work done.260

Another noted that “I am rewarded for how well I can extract rule of law
from cases and apply it to a new set of facts. So, after last semester’s
exams, I have devoted more energy just practicing technical method of
rule  facts  application.”261
This self-referential pattern can lead students (and faculty) to
downplay or abandon creative, non-linear modes of thought, even when
they had experience prior to law school with these methodologies.262 For
255. See KISSAM, supra note 98, at 6-7; see also Richard, supra note 226, at 48.
256. See Elbow, supra note 14.
257. See Lesnick, supra note 249, at 1159.
258. See KISSAM, supra note 98, at 98.
259. See SMITH & BERG, supra note 14, at 47-8.
260. Student A, Lawyering for Change 2019 Blog Post (Apr. 19, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
261. Student B, Lawyering for Change 2019 Blog Post (Apr. 19, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
262. One law student observed: “The ‘softer’ leadership skills that I have been learning
and building for the past few years working, but also prior to that in undergrad, seem less
relevant for law school success. (The fact that my first inclination was to refer to leadership
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some this led them to doubt the relevance of abilities that enabled them
to succeed prior to law school, many of which fall under the umbrella of
proactive lawyering. Some students interpret learning to think like a
lawyer to mean setting aside or unlearning other modes of thought, as
part of becoming a lawyer.
I find it interesting just how much this mode of processing seeps into
everything we do. In many ways, it causes problems we become
unused to solving, since the roles we are thrown into often call for
forward thinking, innovative solutions but our practiced mode of
analysis is backward looking and self-contained.263

The methodology of skepticism, with its focus on adjudication and
its essentially critical stance, thus tends to crowd out the imaginative,
forward-looking methodologies associated with proactive lawyering.264
“The greatest imaginative cost of the canonical style of legal reasoning
is negative: it fills up the imaginative space in which another way of
thinking might take root, and it does so in the crucial testing ground on
which authoritative ideals meet practical realities.”265
Students and researchers also report a shift in the way students
listen to each other. They describe themselves as more likely to listen
instrumentally and with the relevant legal categories in mind, which
draws them away from “the norms and conventions that many members
of our society, including future clients, use to solve conflicts and moral
dilemmas.”266 This decontextualization encourages students to treat
people as characters in a legal drama. They listen for how they can use
or refute what they are hearing, and report finding it more difficult to
listen with the goal of understanding, empathizing, or appreciating the
perspective and experience of others. They also are more likely to speak
to demonstrate their proficiency, prove their point, or win an argument.
Researchers have documented—and many students reported—
reluctance, particularly in large classes, to ask questions solely out of

skills as ‘soft’ even though we have learned about concrete methods and processes to improve
our leadership capacity exemplifies the ways in which this paradox is playing out in my
education.)” Student G, Lawyering for Change 2019 Blog Post (April 16, 2019) (on file with
author).
263. Student F, Lawyering for Change 2019 Blog Post (April 16, 2019) (on file with
author).
264. Id. One advice book, based on interviews and surveys of law students, exhorts law
students to understand that “you are being trained as a technician, not an innovator.” See also
YOUNG, supra note 225, at 32.
265. See UNGER, supra note 28, at 106.
266. See MERTZ, supra note 22, at 99.
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curiosity or to take the risk of appearing uncertain or, even worse, not
understanding.267
Research conducted on practicing lawyers shows that the mindset
and methodology of competition and skepticism invited by legality
coalesce into a culture and way of being for many lawyers. Although
there is evidence of a “lawyer personality” that is predisposed to be
skeptical or to see the glass as half empty rather than half full,268 there is
also evidence that these tendencies are engendered at least in part by
legal education,269 as well as by the prevailing legal culture in which one
practices.270 Students describe coming in with an orientation of
exploration, learning, and risk-taking, and confronting experiences in
and out of the classroom that undercut their orientation toward growth
and learning from failure. This fosters a tendency to avoid asking
questions if they are uncertain or confused, and to treat performance in
law school, and particularly failure, as defining of their ability. This
pattern tracks findings of more systematic empirical studies of law
student experience.271 Research also documents that women, people of
color, and first-generation students may experience this dynamic with
particular intensity.272
There is evidence that crowding out proactive lawyering may play
a contributing role in the widespread dissatisfaction and unhappiness
that many law students and lawyers experience.273 How many times
267. See London, Downey & Mace, supra note 216, at 476; Sturm & Guinier, supra
note 27, at 530.
268. See Larry Richard, Herding Cats: The Lawyer Personality Revealed, 29 REP. TO
LEGAL MGMT., Aug. 2002, at 1, 4. It is worth noting that Richard’s findings are based on
studies primarily of partners in large private firms and corporate law departments.
269. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 27; Lawrence S. Krieger & Kennon M. Sheldon,
What Makes Lawyers Happy? A Data-Driven Prescription to Redefine Professional Success,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 619, 624 (2015) (describing core changes in student values and
motivations during law school and consistent undermining effects on student values,
interpersonal caring, and moral and ethical decision-making, and recommending shifting
institutional emphases from competition, status, and tangible benefits to support,
collaboration, interest, and personal purpose).
270. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 50, at 549-50.
271. See generally London, Downey & Mace, supra note 216.
272. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN:
WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997); London, Downey & Mace,
supra note 216, at 455-56; Elena Rodriguez, Student Thriving at Columbia Law School: An
Asset-Based Study of Climate for Student Engagement and Support (2016) (unpublished
paper); Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem Solvers, supra note 2.
273. See Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
33 (2001); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal Education Have
Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and
Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261 (2004); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy,
and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV.
871, 888-906 (1999).
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have you heard a practitioner say, “I am a recovering lawyer,” as if
lawyering were a disease? Or describe themselves as having left the
practice of law, while continuing to play roles that fall squarely under
the umbrella of proactive lawyering? The failure to address head on the
tension between legality and proactive lawyering invites some law
students to conclude that the most important aspects of themselves are
not part of being a lawyer.274
B. Inviting premature or problematic resolution of ambivalence and
contradictions
Many law schools now supplement their core curriculum with a
menu of discrete electives that provide students with the opportunity to
learn various proactive lawyering skills and practices, usually starting in
the second year.275 This approach of supplementing legality with
proactive lawyering resembles what paradox scholars call “splitting.” 276
This strategy assigns responsibility for a less valued activity to a separate
and lower status domain. Proactive lawyering pedagogy often occurs in
distinct realms, apart from mainstream law school offerings focused on
legality and with insufficient opportunity for students to integrate these
experiences. Different people occupy the spaces focused on legality and
proactive lawyering—often with different status, physical locations, and
communities of practice.277 To varying degrees, these two modes of
thought and practice operate on separate tracks, often with non-lawyers,
specialized clinical faculty, adjunct faculty, or administrators focusing
on cultivating proactive lawyering skills alongside legality, while faculty
teaching the mainstream conventional law classes maintain their
pedagogy oriented around teaching and critiquing legality.278
274. See Schiltz, supra note 273, at 915. The ABA has recently recognized the urgency of
addressing the issue of lawyers’ wellbeing. See NAT’L TASK FORCE ON LAWYER
WELL-BEING, THE PATH TO LAWYER WELL-BEING: PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR POSITIVE CHANGE (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/
abanews/ThePathToLawyerWellBeingReportRevFINAL.pdf.
275. See HEINEMAN, LEE & WILKINS, supra note 12; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note
24; see also David I.C. Thomson, Defining Experiential Legal Education, 1 J. EXPERIENTIAL
LEARNING 1 (2015), https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002
&context=jel.
276. See SMITH & BERG, supra note 14, at 68.
277. See Todd A. Berger, Three Generations and Two Tiers: How Participation in Law
School Clinics and the Demand for “Practice-Ready” Graduates Will Impact the Faculty
Status of Clinical Law Professors, 43 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 129, 137-38 (2014) (discussing
a difference in faculty status between clinical faculty and non-clinical faculty).
278. Deborah Maranville, Cynthia Batt, Lisa R. Bliss & Carolyn W. Kaas, Incorporating
Experiential Education Throughout the Curriculum, in BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 162 (Deborah Maranville, Lisa
Radtke Bliss, Carolyn Wilkes Kaas & Antoinette Sedillo López eds., 2015).
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For many students, courses emphasizing proactive lawyering
comprise a small part of their overall law school experience. As of
August 2014, the American Bar Association requires law students to
take six credits of experiential learning as part of their course of study,
out of a total of eighty-four credits required for graduation—seven
percent of their total education.279 Although some law professors have
begun experimenting with integrating forms of proactive lawyering into
conventional pedagogy, many non-clinical faculty members continue to
organize their courses around casebooks that prioritize learning legal
reasoning and parsing appellate decisions as the primary text for learning
the law.280
The siloed and lower status nature of proactive lawyering makes it
difficult for students to experience proactive lawyering as a coherent
methodology with its own rigor and practices extending beyond a
particular course or content area. Students struggle to make sense of the
conflicting pedagogy and messages promoted in different quarters of the
legal academy.
Faculty might unwittingly contribute to this
counter-productive cycling by introducing methodologies of possibility
alongside legality, without making explicit the assumptions and
practices of either, discussing the impact of one on the other, or
equipping students to navigate the contradictions they experience.
For example, law school leadership courses sometimes use the
same materials, cases, and pedagogy used in business schools. Business
school cases do not typically address the situations lawyers face, or how
proactive lawyering practices relate to conventional lawyering roles.
Design thinking instructs students to cooperate and to place critique
aside, sometimes without accounting sufficiently for tensions and
barriers erected by methodological skepticism.281 Materials used in law
school classes (including my own) to cultivate leadership and build the
capacity for difficult conversations contain a blanket critique of
evaluation, comparisons, and judgment, without situating those critiques
in lawyers’ responsibility for engaging in these practices as part of their
roles. They may shy away from grappling with how proactive
279. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA
STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
2014-2015 standard 303(a)(3), at 16 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2014_2015_aba_standards_and_rules_of_proc
edure_for_approval_of_law_schools_bookmarked.pdf.
280. See HEINEMAN, LEE & WILKINS, supra note 12, at 54 (observing that legal reasoning,
taught through Socratic dialogue, remains the centerpiece of legal education).
281. See Hagan, supra note 129; Margaret Hagan, Design Thinking & Law: A Perfect
Match, OPEN L. LAB (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.openlawlab.com/2014/01/16/designthinking-law-perfect-match/.
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lawyering will be affected by its adjudicatory twin or denigrate the
skills that legality requires.
Scholarly work sometimes exhibits this same tendency to sidestep
the paradoxical relationship between legality and proactive lawyering by
proposing hybrids or substitutes for conventional legality without
adequately addressing the tension between adjudicatory and proactive
lawyering. My work on second generation discrimination, for example,
simply cast the court in the role of catalyst and problem solver, without
addressing how legality’s approach to motivation and justice might limit
courts’ capacity to serve as an effective intermediary.282 After
acknowledging critics’ worries about cosmetic compliance and
cooptation,283 I downplayed the prevalence of these problems without
confronting their roots in paradox, much less strategizing about how to
navigate those dualities.284
In Violence and the Word, Robert Cover warned of the dangers of
downplaying or overlooking the impact of legality’s relationship to
violence on law’s effort to generate norm communities. To some degree,
that tension is inescapable. Robert Cover expresses these contradictions
in their most stark form, observing that “pain and death destroy the world
that ‘interpretation’ calls up.”285 “[J]udges … kill the diverse legal
traditions that compete with the State.”286 By failing to attend to the
lawyering paradoxes, law schools similarly squelch capacity to navigate
ambiguity and stay connected to what they care about.
C. Critique detached from transformative possibilities: Contributing to
cynicism about law’s relationship to justice
Many faculty and students alike are well aware of many of these
limitations built into conventional lawyering. Critical analysis of case
law happens regularly in mainstream law school classrooms. “Thinking
like a lawyer” includes identifying the flaws in courts’ reasoning,
weighing competing policy considerations, and understanding the limits
of courts as a way of addressing complex problems lacking clear
solutions. Indeed, critique is part and parcel of effective doctrinal
282. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
283. For a sample of the critiques, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006); Douglas NeJaime, When New
Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2009).
284. See, e.g., Scott & Sturm, supra note 70, at 593; Susan Sturm, The Architecture of
Inclusion: Interdisciplinary Insights on Pursuing Institutional Citizenship, 30 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 409, 424 (2007).
285. Cover, supra note 122, at 1602.
286. Id. at 1610.
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teaching.287 These critiques run the gamut from the reasoning or results
of particular court to systemic critiques of legality’s legitimacy and
impact, drawing on legal realism, critical legal studies, critical race
theory, feminist theory, interdisciplinary studies, and experimentalism.
Many professors expose the contradictions between law and justice,
but do not adequately equip students or the legal system to build an
affirmative way of grappling with them within the current law school
structure. Their critical lens identifies the limits of legality and the need
to reimagine legal education, but it does not equip students to get from
here to there.288 As one student in Lawyering for Change noted:
During orientation, law students are urged to never let go of their
values, to use their education to go forth and make change they want
to see, etc. But these values are by no means reflected in our classes,
though to be fair I do think that almost all my professors do a really
good job of pushing all of us to be critical of the systems we study.
The main issue is that the type of thinking essential to leadership
values aren’t really the ones that are fostered or tested in class, and I
don’t really even know how that would look.289

Students report that they lack venues and opportunities for
processing their doubts and ambivalence. In many law schools, the
mainstream curriculum does not systematically focus on the non-judicial
forms and venues that lawyers occupy, and that law engages. Nor has
legal education generally structured the curriculum to afford students
opportunities to reflect on their own. We have not yet developed the
rigorous methodologies of possibility into our thinking and teaching.
The relentless press of work, combined with the pressure to project
competence, discourages students from engaging in much-needed
reflection about the contradictions they face. Some of this is a function
of the court-centeredness of so much of legal education.
Faced with glaring disconnects between law and justice, students
are left to their own devices to figure out what to do with those critiques.
When students experience this critique without also engaging what can
be done about it, students may become cynical about the law and its
relationship to justice. This leads some to disengage from law school
and from the possibility of achieving justice through law. Students
anguish about the disconnect between their values and the law, between

287. See Post, supra note 5.
288. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32
J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982); KISSAM, supra note 98; UNGER, supra note 28; MERTZ, supra
note 22; Post, supra note 5.
289. Student D, Lawyer Leadership Blog Post (Sept. 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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legal definitions of justice and justice as it is experienced in the world
(as did I when I was in law school).
If students lack regular opportunities to engage with others and with
faculty about these emotions and concerns, and to grapple seriously with
ways to have positive impact in the face of legality’s limitations, the
paradoxes turn into frustration, discouragement, and for some,
disengagement.
We all seem to feel similarly that the law degree has the potential to
empower us to make meaningful change and also forces us into a
rigid system with a specialized skillset that makes it feel more
difficult to make these changes. I sometimes wonder if we just have
to accept that we’re going into a very structured world or if accepting
that just makes us more complicit/unmotivated to actually make
these changes. 290

As Duncan Kennedy noted in his pathbreaking critique, first-year law
students have no way to think about law “in a way that will allow [one]
to enter into it, to criticize without utterly rejecting it, and to manipulate
it without self-abandonment to [their] system of thinking and doing.”291
Students surmise that their success or failure largely turns on swiftly
learning to use the new language, leaving no time to find the political
substance of the rules they are studying. This can lead to cynicism about
the law and to giving up on the law as a way to advance justice.292
For non-believers in law’s neutrality, which includes many law
students, the cognitive dissonance between legal doctrine and their sense
of fairness, their politics, and their values leads them to question law’s
legitimacy, to become cynical about law’s relationship to justice, and for
some, to disengage. However, as the next section explores, the paradox
literature offers a way to move forward in way that treats these
contradictions as a source of creative friction, rather than as a
self-defeating cycle.
IV. NAVIGATING LAWYERING PARADOXES
How can legal education and legal practice move beyond crowding
out proactive lawyering, forcing a problematic choice between legality
and proactive lawyering, and critiquing the status quo without offering a
pathway forward? Can individuals and systems simultaneously learn
and practice the critical, categorical, formal, and judgment-based logic
290. Student E, Lawyer Leadership Class Blog Post (Jan. 14, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
291. Kennedy, supra note 288, at 599-600.
292. See MERTZ, supra note 22, at 214, 220; YOUNG, supra note 225; Sturm & Guinier,
supra note 27, at 546-47.
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of legality and the creative, improvisational, and relationship-building
logic of proactive lawyering? Is there a way to equip law students and
lawyers to hold the tension between this duality? Are there ways to
facilitate students’ and faculty’s engagement with lawyers’ roles as
catalysts for justice and facilitators of democracy when the institutions
and politics demonstrably thwart those values?
These questions underlie core challenges facing the legal profession
and the polity: whether we can have legal and political institutions that
will uphold the rule of law, advance justice, and work to revitalize a
polarized and unjust democracy. Many, both inside and outside the
academy and the legal profession, have expressed deep concern about
law’s legitimacy in the face of institutionalized disconnects between law
and justice, order and principle, predictability and purpose. Law
students will have to assume responsibility for bridging these gaps,
which in turn requires navigating the tensions built into lawyering. Law
schools bear the responsibility for equipping law students to do so. This
means that law schools must teach their law students how to navigate
paradox.
The lens of paradox offers an approach that produces creative
tension between legality and proactive lawyering, builds the capacity to
hold that tension, and equips lawyers to harness that tension to closing
the gap between formal and substantive justice. This section headlines
what I have learned from my decades of study and struggle. Drawing on
the paradox literature, my experience in teaching and action research,
and the practices of creative outliers, this Section offers three strategies
for forging dynamic tension between legality and proactive lawyering:
(1) building the capacity to navigate lawyering paradoxes; (2)
integrating proactive lawyering with conventional legal pedagogy; and
(3) designing and organizing short term experiments, spaces, and
practices to facilitate long-term culture change.
A. Building the Capacity to Navigate Lawyering Paradoxes
[T]he test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed
ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to
function.293

One of the most surprising and encouraging insights from the
paradox literature involves the power of simply seeing the conflicting
aspects of lawyering through the lens of paradox and developing the
capacity to navigate the contradictions you come to recognize. Research
293. F. Scott Fitzgerald, Essay: The Crack-Up, KQED (Aug. 31, 2005),
https://www.pbs.org/wnet/americanmasters/f-scott-fitzgerald-essay-the-crack-up/1028/.
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suggests that seeing those tensions as paradoxes actually changes how
we experience them.294 This shift in meaning enables a move from trying
to resolve a dilemma that may not be resolvable to sitting with observed
contradictions, accepting that they coexist, trying to understand how
they operate, and inquiring about whether we can resolve them or must
instead learn how to work through them.
“ ‘ Working through’ does not imply eliminating or resolving
paradox, but constructing a more workable certainty that enables
change.”295 This shift occurs by creating opportunities for noticing,
observing, and accepting the paradoxical relationship between legality
and proactive lawyering when that duality surfaces, with specific
attention to the opposing yet interdependent practices and mindsets
called for by each and the potential links between them. The idea is to
foster actors’ active awareness of the duality by noticing a paradox
without attempting to resolve or resist it but instead observing it in
practice. This reframing move serves to enable people to sit with the
conflict and to learn their way into the process of maintaining both.
Peter Elbow provides some insight into why “searching for
contradiction and affirming both sides can allow you to find both the
limitations of the system in which you are working and a way to break
out of it.”296 Using Chaucer as an illustration, Elbow notes that by
“setting up a polar opposition and affirming both sides,” we “lay the
framework for a broader frame of reference, ensuring that neither side
can ‘win.’ ” 297 The seeming dilemma can be arranged “so that we can
only be satisfied by taking the larger view.”298
For example, one study observed successful chamber music groups
built the capacity to name and accept the paradoxical relationship
between their need to individuate and express autonomy as a musician,
on the one hand, and the need to blend, cooperate, and come together
around a shared musical idea, on the other.299 Researchers learned that
members of successful string quartets came to understand the upside and
the downside of either pole.300 Acceptance helps members avoid

294. See SMITH & BERG, supra note 14, at 259-65; Elbow, supra note 14, at 240; see also
JOHNSON, supra note 99 (providing practical strategies for managing polarities).
295. Lotte S. Lüscher & Marianne W. Lewis, Organizational Change and Managerial
Sensemaking: Working Through Paradox, 51 ACAD. MGMT. J. 221, 234 (2008).
296. Elbow, supra note 14, at 243.
297. See id. at 141.
298. See SMITH & BERG, supra note 14, at 240, 242.
299. J. Keith Murnighan & Donald E. Conlon, The Dynamics of Intense Work Groups: A
Study of British String Quartets, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 165, 165 (1991).
300. Id.
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unresolvable debates that sparked vicious cycles breeding distrust,
enabling them to “play through” paradox.
The power of simply noticing paradox resonates with my own
observation and experience in my teaching and research. For example,
many Lawyer Leadership students described their discovery of the
paradox frame as paradigm-shifting in their self-conception, in their
choice to pursue law, and in their path to success and thriving as
lawyers.301 These students had been stuck in a dilemma about how to
choose between prestige and purpose, lawyering and social justice,
cooperative and adversarial roles, and professional identity and personal
growth. The idea of holding both shifted the questions they asked
themselves, enhanced the quality of their reflections, and gave them
tools to choose how they think, relate to classmates and material, and
express emotions and needs.
Holding paradox is a learned skill, one that lawyers must master to
be effective in their multiple roles. Because lawyering paradoxes
cannot, by definition, be either avoided or resolved, effective lawyering
requires expanding the conception of what it means to “think like a
lawyer” to include understanding lawyering paradoxes and developing
the ambidexterity to move back and forth between legality and proactive
lawyering.302 This is easier said than done. Ambidexterity is
challenging and inefficient, at least in the short run. But it can happen
nonetheless. Law schools have been forced to adapt in new ways during
the triple pandemic of Covid-19, the national racial reckoning, and the
threat to rule of law values exposed by the 2020 election. These ongoing
crises and challenges might provide the impetus for building the capacity
to deal with contradictions and face unavoidable risks. Common
purpose can sustain connection across the inevitable tensions fueling
separation while encouraging continued fidelity to the values of each
opposing practice. Shared vision can justify the inefficiencies and time
required for ambidexterity to develop.
Holding paradox also requires emotional and relational skills and
strategies enabling individuals and institutions to recognize the
inevitability of these conflicts and to remain in the tensions and
discomfort they generate. The triple pandemic has shown that law
schools can help students and faculty collectively cope with stress,
301. See, e.g., Student A, supra note 260; Student B, supra note 261; Student C,
Lawyering for Change 2019 Blog Post (Apr. 16, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); Student D, supra note 289.
302. See O’Reilly & Tushman, supra note 99, at 188 (identifying ambidexterity as the
capacity to pursue simultaneously the routines, processes, and skills required for exploitation
and exploration, which are fundamentally in tension with each other).
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uncertainty, and unavoidable conflict. Supports developed to help
current and future lawyers persist amidst uncertainty and crisis will also
cultivate the emotional and relational skills needed to hold paradox.
B. Designing for Strategic Integration of Legality and Proactive
Lawyering
A second key strategy involves integrating proactive lawyering
with legality, while maintaining separate space for the development of
proactive lawyering capacities. For students and lawyers to value
proactive lawyering, its core practices must be integrated into the
formative spaces and understanding of what it means to think like a
lawyer. Otherwise, many students will continue to experience proactive
lawyering as marginal. To be taken seriously and become part of
students’ identity as lawyers, proactive lawyering roles and practices
must be incorporated into core areas of the curriculum, including the
first-year foundation curriculum and courses that most students take,
such as corporations, criminal procedure, and family law. Practices such
as problem solving, perspective taking, and institutional design can be
juxtaposed with legal doctrine and adjudication, in ways that will equip
students to understand both their tension and their interrelationship.
At the same time, proactive lawyering requires its own space for
development on its own terms. Building on the strong foundation
offered by clinical legal education, effective integration requires
expanding the number of offerings focused on proactive lawyering
skills, increasing the percentage of those offerings that are required for
graduation, and finding ways to treat these offerings as part of the core
law school canon.
I have experimented with heightening awareness of the paradoxical
relationship between legality and proactive lawyering in mainstream law
classes. Civil Procedure, for example, provides many opportunities to
connect formal legal doctrine or practice with proactive lawyering
practices, mindsets, and relationships. I have introduced the idea of
paradox at the points where cooperation and competition have to operate
simultaneously,303 or where there is a tension between students’ sense of
justice and the law’s definition of justice. These opportunities actually
permeate even the most conventional civil procedure class. When these
contradictions arise, rather than simply bracketing them and moving on
(as I have done in the past), I invite the students to identify the multiple
and conflicting meanings of due process, and the requirements to
303. These situations happen throughout civil legal process and are built into the federal
rules. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 37, 68.
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collaborate and mediate before parties can call upon the court to sanction
an opposing party. I provide opportunities in and out of class for
students to reflect about the roles they might occupy and what kinds of
questions they might ask or relationships they might build in each of
those roles.
That exercise gives rise to questions that push students to identify
and grapple with the paradoxes: How might those roles and modes of
thought conflict? How might you manage that conflict? What
challenges might you face? Where in your legal education will you have
the opportunity to focus more deeply on the critical proactive lawyering
skills? When justice defined by the courts starkly contradicts students’
(and often the judge’s stated) conception of justice, the paradox idea has
also helped give students a way to be both inside and outside
conventional legal analysis. We can explore, even if superficially, what
other venues, roles, and practices might be part of an effort to advance
substantive as well as formal justice, provide a space for students to draw
on their prior experience, and concretely identify when and where
students can learn in greater depth about proactive lawyering. This
strategy enables students to see early on that thinking like a lawyer
actually involves multiple ways of thinking, including mastering
traditional legal reasoning as well as connecting it to other ways of
thinking, even when the primary focus of the class is on legality.
This integration process will require experimenting with and
rethinking the system of evaluation, including in conventional law
school classes. Law schools will have to find ways to assess and reward
the cultivation of knowledge and skills called for by proactive lawyering.
That will mean moving beyond easy-to-grade issue spotting exams,
which tend to overvalue legality and to discourage assessment of
proactive lawyering skills.
The call for integration of legality and proactive lawyering provides
a strong argument for elevating the status of clinical legal faculty in law
schools. Clinical faculty are way ahead of many podium faculty in their
focus on cultivating both legality and proactive lawyering, and
navigating the inevitable tensions between them.304 Clinical faculty are
well equipped to help students learn proactive lawyering skills. Rather
than reinvent the wheel, law schools could integrate legality and
proactive lawyering by encouraging and rewarding connections between
clinical and non-clinical faculty, both in pedagogy and in research. This
move would require flattening the hierarchy that currently maintains
304. See Thomson, supra note 275; Bryan L. Adamson et al., The Status of Clinical
Faculty in the Legal Academy: Report of the Task Force on the Status of Clinicians and the
Legal Academy, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 353 (2012).
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clinical faculty in second-class status in many law schools and blurring
or even eliminating the arbitrary distinctions between clinical and
non-clinical faculty.305
C. Pursuing Long-Term Culture Change Through Short-Term
Experiments
The strategies discussed thus far target individual faculty members
and students who can put those strategies into use without major change
in the law school environment. Those local efforts enable enterprising
faculty and students to cultivate the capacity to navigate paradox without
the kind of culture change that is both so necessary and difficult to
achieve in law schools. But without a change in the larger context, these
experiments will remain marginal, and many students are likely to
continue to find themselves stuck in counter-productive contradictions
rather than dynamic tensions.
For these spaces to take root and produce sustainable change,
innovation must operate on multiple levels simultaneously and across
different time horizons. Individual students, faculty, and lawyers require
strategies that will enable them to navigate these tensions from the time
they enter law school. Teachers require frameworks, strategies, and
tools that they can use in the classroom and in programs operating within
a culture organized around legality. Institutions and their leadership
require ways to push toward transformative change in an environment
that resists change and where the commitments to the status quo are
deeply rooted.
This step means building the environments and structures that will
facilitate productive engagement with the contradictions and
connections between legality and proactive lawyering.306 Proactive
lawyering must move from the margins to the center of legal education
and culture, as well as connect to the sites and incentives that form
students’ identities as lawyers.

305. See Adamson et al., supra note 304, at 384 (“In excluding clinical faculty from full
governance over issues involving the mission and direction of law schools, especially faculty
hiring, retention, and promotion, law schools have created hierarchies in which one class of
permanent faculty members makes decisions affecting another class of permanent members,
often without reciprocity. Such hierarchies exist without reasonable and adequate
justification.”); Minna J. Kotkin, Clinical Legal Education and the Replication of Hierarchy,
26 CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 300-01 (2019) (invoking the recommendations of American
Association of Law Schools Task Force to urge increasing the status of clinical faculty and
reducing the hierarchy that persists in many law schools).
306. See Underhill, supra note 207, at 216; O’Reilly & Tushman, supra note 99
(emphasizing the importance of designing spaces that enable contradictory processes to
flourish).
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This culture change sounds daunting, but it need not proceed top
down and whole hog. Experimentation will be key to moving this
strategy forward.307 Courses and programs that support an integrated
experience for law students offer one form of experimentation. A recent
white paper called Re-Envisioning Professional Education describes
several initiatives underway that are experimenting with building these
kinds of learning environments, including at Georgetown, Northwestern,
and Stanford Law Schools.308 The Davis Polk Leadership fellowships
and innovation grants recently launched at Columbia Law School offer
another example of this kind of experimentation.309 The line between
clinical and non-clinical classes has become more blurry, with some
faculty linking experiential learning with classes focused on developing
traditional legal skills.
Another strategy involves building cohorts of students, faculty,
staff, and lawyers who are engaged in this kind of learning and practice,
linking them with each other, and creating incentives for others to learn
from their example.310 Courses and research that rely on collaboration
as the way to develop legal skills and solve problems (such as design
thinking and deals) could include modules that equip students to
collaborate and thus enhance both lawyering and leadership capacities.
The institution might create incentives for people in different roles,
skills, and orientations to collaborate in spaces where legality and
leadership both operate. Long-term sustainability and impact depend
upon linking these innovations to core activities that define the culture
and values of the law school and the legal profession.
Experimentation has the virtue of allowing learning to take place,
building communities of practice interested in learning with and from
each other, and laying the foundation for the kind of learning required to
hold paradox without also requiring wholesale change at the outset.
Support from law school leadership, however, is key to sustaining these
experiments and building them into the fabric of the institutions. Doing
this work can feel emotionally draining and somewhat risky for students,
307. See KAHANE, supra note 185 (showing the value of generating scenarios and trying
experiments as a strategy for navigating conflicting views; ADRIENNE MAREE BROWN,
EMERGENT STRATEGY: SHAPING CHANGE, CHANGING WORLDS 35 (2017) (showing the
importance of experimentation and small-scale change as a way to build toward more
transformative culture change).
308. AUSTIN, CHU & LIEBMAN, supra note 82, at 14-15.
309. Leading Self, Leading Others, Leading Change, COLUM. L. SCH., https://leadershipinitiative.law.columbia.edu/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
310. CUNY modeled this strategy at the institutional level by introducing “houses” as a
core building block of learning. “Houses” were groups of approximately twenty students who
worked through problems with a faculty member who acted as a senior lawyer—one with time
and commitment to teach their juniors. Lesnick, supra note 249, at 1187.
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faculty, and lawyers, but remains critical to being able to meet the
challenges that face law students and the legal profession. Success
depends upon thoughtful experimentation, supported by environments
where conflict and cooperation can operate in tandem, and where it is
possible to fail and recover.311
V. CONCLUSION
I have come full circle in my experience confronting the
contradictions I first encountered when I entered law school. I continue
to encounter unresolvable tensions built into my role as a law professor
and my experience of legal practice. Those tensions are particularly
apparent in the leadership and anti-racism work I have been doing in
legal schools and court systems. How can I as a white woman write and
lead anti-racism work? And yet, how can I, as a white woman in a
position of responsibility, NOT do anti-racism work?312 The mindset
and tools for navigating paradox have enabled me to stay in this
uncomfortable position, and to act even as I regularly confront the limits
of my position and experience. Perhaps the most important lesson I have
learned is to remain engaged in the face of these contradictions,
particularly when it’s hard to do so. Lawyer leadership has helped me
navigate race, and navigating racism has helped me develop lawyer
leadership. Paradox is key to both.
At their best, law schools can cultivate this paradoxical mindset,
and in the process tackle the complex problems facing law schools and
the legal profession, including racism. In the process of building the
capacity to hold paradox, the potential lies to enable lawyers to
reimagine institutions while operating within them. These pockets of
innovation hold potential as fractals— “infinitely complex patterns that
are self-similar across different scales.”313 “They are created by
repeating a simple process over and over in an ongoing feedback
loop.”314
The paradox idea, with its emphasis on holding unresolved tensions
and experimenting, invites the conscious construction of spaces that can
hold legality and proactive lawyering, and link this multiple

311. See id.
312. See Akilah Folami & Susan Sturm, The Paradox of Legal Training and Leadership:
A Conversation between Akilah Folami and Susan Sturm, 48 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 604
(2020). The paradoxes built into anti-racism work are the centerpiece of my forthcoming book
tentatively titled “Rescripting the Racial Narrative: How Anti-racism Paradoxes Can Drive
Transformative Change.”
313. BROWN, supra note 307.
314. Id.
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consciousness to the pursuit of justice. It also builds the capacities
needed to address the intractable problems and deep polarization facing
the world. Linked to each other and made visible, these experiments
hold promise as a launchpad for law schools to equip law students and
the profession to make meaning of the contradictions built into law. This
is what is necessary to realize law’s promise.

